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For the last 40 years, the systems community has invested a lot of effort
in designing techniques for building fault tolerant distributed systems and
services. This effort has produced a massive list of results: the literature
describes how to design replication protocols that tolerate a wide range of
failures (from simple crashes to malicious “Byzantine” failures) in a wide range
of settings (e.g. synchronous or asynchronous communication, with or without
stable storage), optimizing various metrics (e.g. number of messages, latency,
throughput).
These techniques have their roots in ideas, such as the abstraction of
State Machine Replication and the Paxos protocol, that were conceived when
computing was very different than it is today: computers had a single core;
all processing was done using a single thread of control, handling requests
sequentially; and a collection of 20 nodes was considered a large distributed
system.
In the last decade, however, computing has gone through some major
paradigm shifts, with the advent of multicore architectures and large cloud
infrastructures. This dissertation explains how these profound changes impact
the practical usefulness of traditional fault tolerant techniques and proposes
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For the last 40 years, the systems community has invested a lot of effort
in designing techniques for building fault tolerant distributed systems and
services. This effort has produced a massive list of results: the literature
describes how to design replication protocols that tolerate a wide range of
failures (from simple crashes to malicious “Byzantine” failures) in a wide range
of settings (e.g. synchronous or asynchronous communication, with or without
stable storage), optimizing various metrics (e.g. number of messages, latency,
throughput) [1, 11, 14, 16, 18, 21, 43, 46–48, 65, 78].
These techniques have their roots in ideas, such as the abstraction of
State Machine Replication and the Paxos protocol, that were conceived when
computing was very different than it is today: computers had a single core;
all processing was done using a single thread of control, handling requests
sequentially; and a collection of 20 nodes was considered a large distributed
system.
In the last decade, however, computing has gone through some major
paradigm shifts, with the advent of multicore architectures and large cloud
infrastructures. This dissertation explains how these profound changes impact
the practical usefulness of traditional fault tolerant techniques and proposes
new ways to architect these solutions to fit the new paradigms.
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Paradigm shift 1: Multicore With the abrupt halt in the increase of pro-
cessor speeds, parallel execution is the only way to achieve high performance.
The advent of multicore computers has revolutionized the way we process data;
not sequentially any more, but rather in parallel. These days multicore com-
puters and multithreaded processing are used in the overwhelming majority
of computers, making single-threaded execution something of the past.
Multithreaded execution, while ubiquitous, is unfortunately not sup-
ported by most fault tolerance techniques. A popular approach to designing
fault tolerant services is State Machine Replication (SMR). At the core of the
SMR approach is the idea of having a number of replicas deterministically
process the same sequence of requests so that correct replicas traverse the
same sequence of internal states and produce the same sequence of outputs.
Multithreaded execution poses a challenge to this approach. If different repli-
cas interleave requests’ instructions in different ways, the states and outputs
of correct replicas may diverge even if no faults occur. As a result, today’s
SMR systems require servers to process requests sequentially: a replica fin-
ishes executing one request before beginning to execute the next. Of course,
this approach cannot leverage the performance benefits of parallel execution,
which makes it unacceptably inefficient.
Paradigm shift 2: Large cloud infrastructures Traditionally, distributed
systems were conceived as standalone client-server pairs. The emergence of
large cloud infrastructures, however, has significantly changed the way dis-
tributed systems are designed and built. Many cloud applications consist of
multiple services that interact among themselves. When a client sends a re-
quest to a service A (e.g. a web server), that service may need to issue a nested
request to another service B (e.g. a database), in order to process the client’s
request.
These interactions complicate our fault tolerance techniques consider-
ably. For example, if service A is replicated using a protocol that employs
speculative execution [40, 43], where request execution may be rolled back,
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then sending nested requests to another service B means exposing B to a
speculative state of A. If speculation fails at A, rolling back the state of A is
no longer enough; one must somehow roll back the nested request to service B ,
along with its effects. Even worse, if those effects have already been observed
by a client of B , there is no way to repair this inconsistency.
Furthermore, even when service A does not employ speculative execu-
tion, but instead uses sequential execution, things are not ideal. If service A
employs sequential execution, issuing nested requests to other services can lead
to significant performance degradation—even below the already low standards
of sequential execution—since sequential execution forces service A to remain
idle while nested requests to other services are in flight.
In this thesis we rethink the architecture and protocols of replicated ser-
vices to accommodate multithreaded execution and interaction between mul-
tiple services. In particular we make the following contributions:
Rethink the replication architecture to support multithreading. We
show that the current reliance on sequential execution arises from the
agree-execute architecture that is adopted by traditional replication sys-
tems. This architecture requires that replicas reach agreement on the
order of requests and then execute requests in that order; a requirement
that is at odds with the paradigm of multithreaded execution, where re-
quests are not executed in any particular order. To address this problem,
we submit that a radical architectural change is required. In Chapter 3
we propose a new execute-verify architecture, where replicas first specu-
latively execute requests in parallel, and without having agreed on their
order; and then proceed to reach agreement on whether enough replicas
have reached the same state and produced the same responses. Such
speculation may not always succeed, however, since different thread in-
terleavings could cause different replicas to diverge. Chapter 3 describes
how we can make this new architecture efficient in practice. In particular
we describe how to efficiently (a) minimize the probability of divergence,
(b) detect whether a divergence has occurred, and (c) repair a divergence
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when it occurs. The resulting system, Eve, achieves two properties that
prior replica coordination protocols have treated as fundamentally at
odds with each other: nondeterministic interleaving of requests and ex-
ecution independence. Nondeterministic interleaving of requests allows
Eve to achieve high-performance replication for multi-core servers. For
example, in our experiments with the TPC-W benchmark, Eve achieves a
6.5x speedup over sequential execution that approaches the 7.5x speedup
achieved by the original unreplicated server. Execution independence
allows Eve to mask a wide range of faults, including Byzantine faults.
Notably, we find that execution independence pays dividends even when
Eve is configured to tolerate only crash or omission failures by offering
the opportunity to mask some concurrency failures.
Refine the protocols to accommodate service interactions. Sequential
execution and speculation, mechanisms widely used in replicated proto-
cols, have significant shortcomings in terms of both correctness and per-
formance when we move away from the simple client-server model to an
environment where services interact. In Chapter 4 we describe Adam,
a novel replication protocol that addresses these shortcomings. To ad-
dress the correctness violations that can be triggered by speculation, we
propose a novel technique that allows a service to employ speculative
execution without exposing it to other services. In practical terms, this
technique makes it safe to use multithreaded execution when replicated
services interact with other services. To mitigate the performance degra-
dation caused by sequential execution in such settings, we observe that
replica convergence does not require sequential execution: any determin-
istic request schedule can achieve that goal. We propose a new pipelined
execution scheme where replicas do not remain idle waiting for nested
requests, but instead rotate execution among the available requests ac-
cording to a deterministic schedule. Despite its simplicity, we show that




State Machine Replication (SMR) is a powerful technique for implementing
fault tolerant services. The main idea of SMR is to have a number of replicas
deterministically process the same requests so that correct replicas traverse the
same sequence of internal states and produce the same sequence of outputs.
In this chapter, we describe the abstraction of a replicated state machine, as
well as the way SMR has been implemented for the past 40 years.
2.1 The Replicated State Machine abstraction
A state machine consists of state variables, which encode its state, and com-
mands, which transform its state. A client of the state machine makes a request
to execute a command. The request names a state machine, names the com-
mand to be performed, and contains any information needed by the command.
Processing a client request causes the state machine to produce an output and
transition to a new state; or, in the case of read-only commands, to transition
back to the same state. In a deterministic state machine the output and state
transition caused by a command are determined only by the current state and
the command.
To implement a fault tolerant state machine, one must provide the
illusion of a state machine that retains both safety and liveness—collectively
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called correctness—despite a (configurable) number of faults. This can be
achieved by replicating that state machine, running each replica on a separate
physical machine. The number of replicas required is, of course, a function
of the number and type of failures that the replicated state machine should
tolerate. Non-faulty replicas must start from the same initial state. The
correctness of a replicated state machine consists of the following safety and
liveness requirements:
Safety All correct state machine replicas should produce the same observable
states and outputs. These states and outputs must be consistent with
those produced by a single correct state machine.
Liveness When a client issues a request to the replicated state machine, it
eventually receives a response.
The safety requirement of a Replicated State Machine, as stated above,
is quite simple. It only requires that correct replicas should produce observable
states and outputs that could have been produced by a single correct server,
and that replicas do not diverge; convergence is crucial in maintaining the
illusion of a single correct state machine.
2.2 Implementation
To achieve convergence, SMR implementations of the past 40 years have made
a simplifying assumption: state machines process requests one at a time. This
assumption of sequential execution was in fact so tightly bound with achieving
replica convergence, that it appeared as part of the specification of replicated
state machines, as it was described in Schneider’s tutorial [65]. In this thesis,
we aim to decouple the way in which requests are executed—which we view
as an implementation choice—from the actual specification that we presented
above.
The assumption of sequential execution allows servers to be modeled as
deterministic state machines, greatly simplifying the implementation of SMR:
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all that is required is that replicas agree on the order in which requests should
be executed. Once an order has been agreed upon, replicas simply execute
requests in that order. Since state machines are deterministic, correct replicas
are guaranteed to traverse the same sequence of state transformations and
produce the same sequence of responses. This agree-execute approach has
been adopted by a large number of replication protocols [1, 14, 18, 21, 43, 46],
from the original Paxos protocol [46] to more recent and advanced protocols
like Zyzzyva [43]. In 2003, Yin et al. [78] described how replication protocols
can be separated into an agreement and an execution phase, crystallizing the
picture of this popular agree-execute architecture.
For all its simplicity, the underlying assumption of the agree-execute
architecture has an unfortunate consequence: replicas must execute requests
in a sequential order. In other words, parallel execution of requests is not
easily supported by this architecture, since parallel execution can cause dif-
ferent replicas to execute requests’ instructions in different orders, causing
divergence. This drawback has become significantly more pronounced in the
last ten years, during which multicore computers and multithreaded execution
have become ubiquitous. Unfortunately, the current agree-execute architec-
ture forces system designers into an undesirable choice: either give up the
performance of multithreaded execution, or give up the robustness of fault-
tolerant replication. Chapter 3 addresses this dilemma: we show that State
Machine Replication is not, in fact, incompatible with multithreaded execu-
tion. Based on our refinement of the SMR specification, we propose a new
replication architecture that preserves both safety and liveness, while allowing




In this chapter, we present Eve, a novel replication architecture that aims to
reconcile replication with the ability to execute requests in parallel. Our first
step towards this goal was presented in Chapter 2: refining the specification
of state machine replication, no longer requiring that requests are executed
sequentially. Instead, Eve partitions requests in batches and, after taking
lightweight measures to make conflicts within a batch unlikely, it allows dif-
ferent replicas to execute requests within each batch in parallel, speculating
that the result of these parallel executions (i.e. the system’s important state
and output at each replica) will match across enough replicas.
To execute requests in parallel without violating the safety requirements
of replica coordination, Eve turns on its head the established architecture of
state machine replication. Traditionally, deterministic replicas first agree on
the order in which requests are to be executed and then execute them [14, 45,
46, 52, 66, 78]; in Eve, replicas first speculatively execute requests concurrently,
and then verify that they have agreed on the state and the output produced by
a correct replica. If too many replicas diverge so that a correct state/output
cannot be identified, Eve guarantees safety and liveness by rolling back and
sequentially and deterministically re-executing the requests.
Critical to Eve’s performance are mechanisms that ensure that, de-
spite the nondeterminism introduced by allowing parallel execution, repli-
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cas seldom diverge, and that, if they do, divergence is efficiently detected
and reconciled. Eve minimizes divergence through a mixer stage that applies
application-specific criteria to produce groups of requests that are unlikely to
interfere, and it makes repair efficient through incremental state transfer and
fine-grained rollbacks. Note that if the underlying program is correct under
unreplicated parallel execution, then delaying agreement until after execution
and, when necessary, falling back to sequential re-execution guarantees that
replication remains safe and live even if the mixer allows interfering requests
in the same group.
Eve’s execute-verify architecture is general and applies to both crash tol-
erant and Byzantine tolerant systems. In particular, when Eve is configured to
tolerate crash faults, it also provides significant protection against concurrency
bugs, thus addressing a region of the design space that falls short of Byzantine
fault tolerance but that strengthens guarantees compared to standard crash
tolerance. Eve’s robustness stems from two sources. First, Eve’s mixer re-
duces the likelihood of triggering latent concurrency bugs by attempting to
run only unlikely-to-interfere requests in parallel [44, 61]. Second, its execute-
verify architecture allows Eve to detect and recover when concurrency causes
executions to diverge, regardless of whether the divergence results from a con-
currency bug or from distinct correct replicas making different legal choices.
In essence, Eve refines the assumptions that underlie the traditional im-
plementation of state machine replication. In the agree-execute architecture,
the safety requirement that correct replicas agree on the same state and output
is reduced to the problem of guaranteeing that deterministic replicas process
identical sequences of commands (i.e. agree on the same inputs). Eve contin-
ues to require replicas to eventually behave like deterministic state machines
for liveness, but it no longer insists that they execute identical sequences of
requests in the common case: instead of relying on agreement on inputs, Eve
reverts to the actual—and weaker—safety requirement of SMR that replicas
agree on state and output.
The practical consequence of this refinement is that in Eve correct repli-
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cas enjoy two properties that prior replica coordination protocols have treated
as fundamentally at odds with each other: nondeterministic interleaving of
requests and execution independence. Indeed, it is precisely through the com-
bination of these two properties that Eve improves the state of the art for
replicating multi-core servers:
1. Nondeterministic interleaving of requests lets Eve provide high-performance
replication for multi-core servers. Eve gains performance by avoiding
the overhead of enforcing determinism. For example, in our experiments
with the TPC-W benchmark, Eve achieves a 6.5x speedup over sequen-
tial execution. This speedup compares favorably with the 7.5x speedup
achieved by the original unreplicated server. For the same benchmark,
Eve achieves a 4.7x speedup over the Remus primary-backup system [23]
by exploiting its unique ability to allow independent replicas to interleave
requests nondeterministically.
2. Independence lets Eve mask a wide range of faults. Without indepen-
dently executing replicas, it is in general impossible to tolerate arbitrary
faults. Independence makes Eve’s architecture fully general, as our pro-
totype supports tunable fault tolerance [18], retaining traditional state
machine replication’s ability to be configured to tolerate crash, omission,
or Byzantine faults. Notably, we find that execution independence pays
dividends even when Eve is configured to tolerate only crash or omission
failures by offering the opportunity to mask some concurrency failures.
Although we do not claim that our experimental results are general, we
find them promising: for the TPC-W benchmark running on the H2
database, executing requests in parallel on an unreplicated server trig-
gered a previously undiagnosed concurrency bug in H2 73 times in a span
of 750K requests. Under Eve, our mixer eliminated all manifestations of
this bug: it classified the requests that caused the bug as conflicting
and therefore did not allow them to execute in parallel. Furthermore,
when we altered our mixer to occasionally allow conflicting requests to
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be parallelized, Eve detected and corrected the effects of this bug 82%
of the times it manifested, because Eve’s independent execution allowed
the bug to manifest (or not) in different ways on different replicas.
3.1 System model
The novel architecture for state machine replication that we propose is fully
general: Eve can be applied to coordinate the execution of multithreaded
replicas in both synchronous and asynchronous systems and can be configured
to tolerate failures of any severity, from crashes to Byzantine faults.
In this chapter, we primarily target asynchronous environments where
the network can arbitrarily delay, reorder, or lose messages without imper-
iling safety. For liveness, we require the existence of synchronous intervals
during which the network is well-behaved and messages sent between two
correct nodes are received and processed with bounded delay. Because syn-
chronous primary-backup with reliable links is a practically interesting con-
figuration [23], we also evaluate Eve in a server-pair configuration that—like
primary-backup [12]—relies on timing assumptions for both safety and live-
ness.
Eve can be configured to produce systems that are live, i.e. provide
a response to client requests, despite a total of up to u failures, whether of
omission or commission, and to ensure that all responses accepted by correct
clients are correct despite up to r commission failures and any number of omis-
sion failures [18]. Commission failures include all failures that are not omission
failures. The union of omission and commission failures are Byzantine failures.
However, we assume that failures do not break cryptographic primitives; i.e., a
faulty node can never produce a correct node’s MAC. We denote a message X
sent by Y that includes an authenticator (a vector of MACs, one per receiving
replica) as 〈X〉~µY .
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3.2 Protocol overview
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of Eve, whose “execute-verify” design departs
from the “agree-execute” approach of traditional SMR [14, 46, 78].
3.2.1 Execution stage
Eve divides requests in batches, and lets replicas execute requests within a
batch in parallel, without requiring them to agree on the order of request
execution within a batch. However, Eve takes steps to make it likely that
replicas will produce identical final states and outputs for each batch.
Batching Clients send their requests to the current primary execution replica.
The primary groups requests into batches, assigns each batch a sequence num-
ber, and sends them to all execution replicas. Multiple such batches can be
in flight at the same time, but they are processed in order. Along with the
requests, the primary sends any data needed to consistently process any nonde-
terministic requests in the batch (e.g. a seed for random() calls or a timestamp
for gettimeofday() calls [14, 18]). The primary however makes no effort to
eliminate the nondeterminism that may arise when multithreaded replicas in-
dependently execute their batches.
Mixing Each replica runs the same deterministic mixer to partition each
batch received from the primary into the same ordered sequence of parallel-
Batches—groups of requests that the mixer believes can be executed in parallel
with little likelihood that different interleavings will produce diverging results
at distinct replicas. For example, if conflicting requests ρ1 and ρ2 both modify
object A, the mixer will place them in different parallelBatches. Section 3.3.1
describes the mixer in more detail.
Executing (in parallel) Each replica executes the parallelBatches in the















Figure 3.1: Overview of Eve.
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in the ith batch, a replica computes a hash of its application state and of the
outputs generated in response to requests in that batch.
This hash, along with the sequence number i and the hash for batch
i−1, constitute a token that is sent to the verification stage in order to discern
whether the replicas have diverged. We include the hash for the previous
batch to make sure that the system only accepts valid state transitions (see
Section 3.4.1 for why this is necessary). Verification replicas will only accept
a token as valid if they have already agreed that there is a committed hash
for sequence number i− 1 that matches the one in the ith token. Section 3.3.2
describes how we efficiently and deterministically compute the hash of the final
state and outputs.
3.2.2 Verification stage
Eve’s execution stage strives to make divergence unlikely, but offers no guar-
antees: for instance, despite its best effort, the mixer may inadvertently in-
clude conflicting requests in the same parallelBatch and cause distinct correct
replicas to produce different final states and outputs. It is up to the veri-
fication stage to ensure that such divergences cannot affect safety, but only
performance: at the end of the verification stage, all correct replicas that have
executed the ith batch of requests are guaranteed to have reached the same
final state and produced the same outputs.
Agreement The verification stage runs an agreement protocol to determine
the final state and outputs of all correct replicas after each batch of requests.
The input to the agreement protocol (see Section 3.4) are the tokens received
from the execution replicas. The final decision is either commit (if enough to-
kens match) or rollback (if too many tokens differ). In particular, the protocol
first verifies whether replicas have diverged at all: if all tokens agree, the repli-
cas’ common final state and outputs are committed. If there is divergence, the
agreement protocol tallies the received tokens, trying to identify a final state
and outputs pair reached by enough replicas to guarantee that the pair is the
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product of a correct replica. If one such pair is found, then Eve ensures that all
correct replicas commit to that state and outputs; if not, then the agreement
protocol decides to roll back. Note that the actual number of matching tokens
required depends on the configuration at hand. Section 3.4 discusses how this
number is instantiated for two configurations: a BFT and a primary-backup
configuration.
Commit If the result of the verification stage is commit, the execution repli-
cas mark the corresponding sequence number as committed and send the re-
sponses for that parallelBatch to the clients.
Rollback If the result of the verification stage is rollback, the execution
replicas roll back their state to the latest committed sequence number and
re-execute the batch sequentially to guarantee progress. A rollback will also
rotate the current primary, to ensure that a faulty primary cannot compromise
liveness. Furthermore, to guarantee progress, the first batch created by the
new primary, which typically includes some subset of the rolled back requests,
is executed sequentially by all execution replicas.
A serendipitous consequence of its “execute-verify” architecture is that
Eve can mask replica divergences caused by concurrency bugs, i.e. deviations
from an application’s intended behavior triggered by particular thread inter-
leavings [31]. Some concurrency bugs may manifest as commission failures;
however, because such failures are typically triggered probabilistically and are
not the result of the actions of a strategic adversary, they can be often masked
by configurations of Eve designed to tolerate only omission failures.
Note that Eve does not actually know what the application intended
behavior is. Eve simply detects that different replicas have diverged in their
state and responses, and asks them to roll back their state and re-execute the
batch sequentially, thereby masking the concurrency bug. In other words, a
concurrency bug is indistinguishable from a commission failure or a divergence
due to inaccuracy at the mixer. As such, while Eve can be used to mask
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Transaction Read and write keys
getBestSellers read: item, author, order line
getRelated read: item
getMostRecentOrder read: customer, cc xacts, address,
country, order line
doCart read: item
write: shopping cart line, shopping cart
doBuyConfirm read: customer, address
write: order line, item, cc xacts,
shopping cart line
Figure 3.2: The keys used for the 5 most frequent transactions of the TPC-W
workload.
concurrency bugs, it is not very accurate in detecting the presence of such
bugs, as it would introduce a fair amount of false positives.
Of course, like every system that uses redundancy to tolerate failures,
Eve is vulnerable to correlated failures and cannot mask concurrency failures
if too many replicas fail in exactly the same way. This said, Eve’s architecture
should help, both because the mixer, by trying to avoid parallelizing requests
that interfere, makes concurrency bugs less likely and because concurrency
bugs may manifest differently (if at all) on different replicas.
3.3 Execution stage
In this section we describe the execution stage in more detail. In particular, we
discuss the design of the mixer and the design and implementation of the state
management framework that allows Eve to perform efficient state comparison,
state transfer, and rollback.
3.3.1 Mixer design
Parallel execution will result in better performance only if divergence is rare.
The mission of the mixer is to identify requests that may productively be
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executed in parallel and to do so with low false negative and false positive
rates. False negatives will cause conflicting requests to be executed in parallel,
creating the potential for divergence and rollback. False positives will cause
requests that could have been successfully executed in parallel to be serialized,
reducing the parallelism of the execution. Note however that Eve remains safe
and live independent of the false negative and false positive rates of the mixer.
A good mixer is just a performance optimization (albeit an important one).
The mixer we use for our experiments parses each request, trying to
predict which state it will access: depending on the application, this state
can vary from a single file or application-level object to higher-level objects
such as database rows or tables. Two requests conflict when they access the
same object in a read/write or write/write manner. To avoid putting together
conflicting requests, the mixer starts with an empty parallelBatch and two
(initially empty) hash tables, one for objects being read, the other for objects
being written. The mixer then scans in turn each request, mapping the objects
accessed in the request to a read or write key, as appropriate. Before adding a
request to a parallelBatch, the mixer checks whether that request’s keys have
read/write or write/write conflicts with the keys already present in the two
hash tables. If not, the mixer adds the request to the parallelBatch and adds
its keys to the appropriate hash table; when a conflict occurs, the mixer tries
to add the request to a different parallelBatch—or creates a new parallelBatch,
if the request conflicts with all existing parallelBatches.
In our experiments with the H2 Database Engine and the TPC-W work-
load, we simply used the names of the tables accessed in read or write mode
as read and write keys for each transaction2 (see Table 3.2). Note that be-
cause the mixer can safely misclassify requests, we need not explicitly capture
additional conflicts potentially generated through database triggers or view
accesses that may be invisible to us: Eve’s verification stage allows us to be
safe without being perfect. Moreover, the mixer can be improved over time
2H2 uses coarse-grain table-level locking, so it did not make sense to implement conflict
checks at a granularity finer than a table.
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using feedback from the system (e.g. by logging parallelBatches that caused
rollbacks).
Although implementing a perfect mixer might prove tricky for some
cases, we expect that a good mixer can be written for many interesting appli-
cations and workloads with modest effort. Databases and key-value stores are
examples of applications where requests typically identify the application-level
objects that will be affected—tables and values respectively. Our experience so
far is encouraging. Our TPC-W mixer took 10 student-hours to build, without
any prior familiarity with the TPC-W code. As demonstrated in Section 3.5,
this simple mixer achieves good parallelism (acceptably few false positives),
and we do not observe any rollbacks (few or no false negatives).
3.3.2 State management
Moving from an agree-execute to an execute-verify architecture puts pressure
on the implementation of state checkpointing, comparison, rollback, and trans-
fer. For example, replicas in Eve must compute a hash of the application state
reached after executing every batch of requests; in contrast, traditional SMR
protocols checkpoint and compare application states much less often (e.g. when
garbage collecting the request log).
To achieve efficient state comparison and fine-grained checkpointing and
rollback, Eve stores the state using a copy-on-write Merkle tree, whose root
is a concise representation of the entire state. The implementation borrows
two ideas from BASE [62]. First, it includes only the subset of state that
determines the operation of the state machine, omitting other state (such as
an IP address or a TCP connection) that can vary across different replicas but
has no semantic effect on the state and output produced by the application.
Second, it provides an abstraction wrapper on some objects to mask variations
across different replicas.
Similar to BASE [62] and other traditional SMR systems such as PBFT,
Zyzzyva, and UpRight [14, 18, 42], where programmers are required to manu-
18
ally annotate which state is to be included in the state machine’s checkpoint,
our current implementation of Eve manually annotates the application code
to denote the objects that should be added to the Merkle tree and to mark
them as dirty when they get modified.
Compared to BASE, however, Eve faces two novel challenges: maintain-
ing a deterministic Merkle tree structure under parallel execution and parallel
hash generation as well as issues related to our choice to implement Eve in
Java.
Deterministic Merkle trees
To generate the same checksum, different replicas must put the same objects
at the same location in their Merkle tree. In single-threaded execution, de-
terminism comes easily by adding an object to the tree when it is created.
Determinism is more challenging in multithreaded execution when objects can
be created concurrently.
There are two intuitive ways to address the problem. The first option
is to make memory allocation synchronized and deterministic. This approach
not only negates efforts toward concurrent memory allocation [29, 67], but is
unnecessary, since the allocation order usually does not fundamentally affect
replica equivalence. The second option is to generate an ID based on object
content and to use it to determine an object’s location in the tree; this approach
does not work, however, since many objects have the same content, especially
at creation time.
Our solution is to postpone adding newly created objects to the Merkle
tree until the end of the batch, when they can be added deterministically. Eve
scans existing modified objects, and if one contains a reference to an object
not yet in the tree, Eve adds that object into the tree’s next empty slot and
iteratively repeats the process for all newly added objects.
Object scanning is deterministic for two reasons. First, existing objects
are already put at deterministic locations in the tree. Second, given an object,
Eve can iterate all its references in a deterministic order. Usually we can use
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the order in which references are defined in a class. However some classes, like
Hashtable, do not store their references in a deterministic order; we discuss
how to address these classes below.
We do not parallelize the process of scanning for new objects, since it has
low overhead. We do parallelize hash generation, however: we split the Merkle
tree into subtrees and compute their hashes in parallel before combining them
to obtain the hash of the Merkle tree’s root.
Java Language & Runtime
The choice of implementing our prototype in Java provides us with several
desirable features, including an easy way to differentiate references from other
data that simplifies the implementation of deterministic scanning; at the same
time, it also raises some challenges.
First, objects which the Merkle tree holds a reference to are not eligible
for Java’s automatic garbage collection (GC). Our solution is to periodically
perform a Merkle-tree-level scan, using a mark-and-sweep algorithm similar
to Java’s GC, to find unused objects and remove them from the tree. This
ensures that those objects can be correctly garbage collected by Java’s GC. For
the applications we have considered, this scan can be performed less frequently
than Java’s GC, since objects in the tree tend to be “important” and have a
long lifetime. In our experience this scan is not a major source of overhead.
Second, several standard set-like data structures in Java, including in-
stances of the widely-used Hashtable and HashSet classes, are not oblivious to
the order in which they are populated. For example, the serialized state of a
Java Hashtable object is sensitive to the order in which keys are added and re-
moved. So, while two set-like data structures at different replicas may contain
the same elements, they may generate different checksums when added to a
Merkle tree: while semantically equivalent, the states of these replicas would
instead be seen as having diverged, triggering unnecessary rollbacks.
Our solution is to create wrappers [62] that abstract away semantically
irrelevant differences between instances of set-like classes kept at different repli-
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cas. The wrappers generate, for each set-like data structure, a deterministic
list of all the elements it contains, and, if necessary, a corresponding itera-
tor. If the elements’ type is one for which Java already provides a comparator
(e.g. Integer, Long, String, etc.), this is easy to do. Otherwise, the elements
are sorted using an ordered pair (requestId, count) that Eve assigns to each
element before adding it to the data structure. Here, requestId is the unique
identifier of the request responsible for adding the element, and count is the
number of elements added so far to the data structure by request requestId.
In practice, we only found the need to generate two wrappers, one for each
of the two interfaces (Set and Map) commonly used by Java’s set-like data
structures.
3.4 Verification stage
The goal of the verification stage is to determine whether enough execution
replicas agree on their state and responses after executing a batch of requests.
Given that the tokens produced by the execution replicas reflect their current
state as well as the state transition they underwent, all the verification stage
has to decide is whether enough of these tokens match.
To come to that decision, the verification replicas use an agreement
protocol [14, 46] whose details depend largely on the system model. We present
the protocol for two extreme cases: an asynchronous Byzantine fault tolerant
system, and a synchronous primary-backup system. We then discuss how the
verification stage can offer some defense against concurrency bugs and how it
can be tuned to maximize the number of tolerated concurrency bugs.
3.4.1 Asynchronous BFT
In this section we describe the verification protocol for an asynchronous Byzan-
tine fault tolerant system with nE = u+max(u, r) + 1 execution replicas and
nV = 2u+r+1 verification replicas [17, 18], which allows the system to remain
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live despite u failures (whether of omission or commission), and safe despite
r commission failures and any number of omission failures. Readers familiar
with PBFT [14] will find many similarities between these two protocols; this
is not surprising, since both protocols attempt to perform agreement among
2u + r + 1 replicas (3f + 1 in PBFT terminology). The main differences be-
tween these protocols stem from two factors. First, in PBFT the replicas try
to agree on the output of a single node—the primary. In Eve the object of
agreement is the behavior of a collection of replicas—the execution replicas.
Therefore, in Eve verification replicas use a quorum of max(u, r) + 1 match-
ing tokens from the execution replicas, if available, as their “proposed” value.
Second, in PBFT the replicas try to agree on the inputs to the state machine
(the incoming requests and their order). Instead, in Eve replicas try to agree
on the outputs of the state machine (the application state and the responses
to the clients). Hence, in the view change protocol (described below) the ex-
istence of a certificate for a given sequence number is enough to commit that
sequence number to the next view—a prefix of committed sequence numbers
is no longer required.
Why u+max(u, r)+1? At first glance, it might seem like Eve would require
u+r+1 execution replicas, since one must receive at least Q ≥ r+1 matching
responses (for safety) and cannot wait for more than Q ≤ nE−u responses (for
liveness); so nE ≥ u + r + 1. There is, however, an additional, rather subtle,
requirement: that the application state is maintained despite failures. For
example, consider a system where u = 2 and r = 1. In this system committing
requests based on r+ 1(= 2) responses could cause the application state to be
lost if those two replicas were to fail permanently.
Most previous replication protocols implicitly satisfy this requirement
by using 3f+1 execution replicas that are co-located with the agreement repli-
cas. Since Eve separates agreement—or rather verification—from execution,
it can afford to use fewer execution replicas. The price of this reduction in
the replication factor is that we must take care that the application state is
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not permanently lost. In particular, we must ensure that updates to the ap-
plication state are performed in at least Q ≥ u+ 1 replicas. Taking the safety
requirement into consideration, we have that Q ≥ max(u, r) + 1. Adding the
liveness requirement, we get nE ≥ u+max(u, r) + 1.
The protocol When an execution replica executes a batch of requests (i.e., a
sequence of parallelBatches), it sends a 〈verify, view, n, T, e〉~µe message to all
verification replicas, where view is the current view number, n is the batch
sequence number, T is the computed token for that batch, and e is the sending
execution replica. Recall that T contains both the hash of batch n and the
hash of batch n− 1: a verification replica accepts a verify message for batch
n only if it has previously committed a hash for batch n− 1 that matches the
one stored in T . This mechanism is necessary to ensure that the verification
replicas only commit states that correspond to valid state transitions.
Without this mechanism in place, it would be possible for a malicious
replica to coerce the verification replicas to commit two states sn−1 and sn for
sequence numbers n− 1 and n, respectively, that do not correspond to a valid
state transition taken by a correct replica. To understand how this is possible,
consider a simple scenario where u = r = 1. This means there are 3 execution
replicas—call them A, B , and C . In this scenario B is malicious. In batch
n − 1, A and C diverge, and B produces the same token as A, causing the
state of A to be committed for this batch. In the next batch (n), C is still
diverged from the committed state, but does not know it yet, so it proceeds
to execute this batch and produce a token. This time, B “sides” with C : it
produces the same token as C , causing this token to be committed. That way,
B managed to commit two states that belong to diverged executions and may
not correspond to any valid state transition of a correct replica.
Case 1: Replicas reach agreement When a verification replica v re-
ceives max(u, r) + 1 verify messages with matching tokens, it marks this
sequence number as preprepared and sends a 〈prepare, view, n, T, v〉~µv mes-
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sage to all other verification replicas. Similarly, when a verification replica
v receives nV − u matching prepare messages, it marks this sequence num-
ber as prepared and sends a 〈commit, view, n, T, v〉~µv to all other verifica-
tion replicas. Finally, when a verification replica v receives nV − u matching
commit messages, it marks this sequence number as committed and sends a
〈verify-response, view, n, T, v〉~µv message to all execution replicas. Note
that the view number view is the same as that of the verify message; this
indicates that agreement was reached and no view change was necessary.
Case 2: No agreement reached—view change In order to guarantee
liveness, replicas monitor the rate of committed requests and initiate a view
change if it is not high enough [16]. This can happen a) because the pri-
mary execution replica misbehaved and sent different batches of requests to
different replicas; or b) as a result of replica divergence, which stems from the
mixer allowing two conflicting requests to execute in parallel; or c) because of
asynchrony or network loss.
If a verifier replica v receives nE−max(u, r)+1 mutually non-matching
tokens—and is therefore certain that no matching quorum is possible—or the
commit rate is not high enough, it proposes a view change by sending a
〈view-change, view+1,P ,PP [ ], v〉~µv to all verifier replicas, where view + 1
is the next view number, P is the maximum prepared batch sequence num-
ber, along with the corresponding verify messages, and PP [ ] is the sequence
numbers it has preprepared that are greater than P , along with the correspond-
ing verify messages. A correct replica receiving a valid view-change mes-
sage will send a 〈view-change-ack, view+1, s, d, v〉~µv to the primary verifier
replica for view view, where view + 1 is the view number contained in the re-
ceived view-change message, s is the sender of the message and d is a digest
of the message.
When the primary verifier replica for that view receives nV − u valid
view-change messages, each supported by nV − u valid view-change-
ackmessages, it tries to identify a sequence number that should be committed.
24
First it identifies the maximum prepared sequence number P among the view-
change messages it received. It further tries to identify r + 1 replicas that
have preprepared the same token for a sequence number greater than P . If
such a sequence number can be found, the primary will select it as the sequence
number it will commit; otherwise P is selected. Next, the primary will send
the message 〈new-view, view + 1, n, T,VC, v〉~µv to all verifier replicas, where
view + 1 is the number of the new view, n is the selected sequence number,
T is the corresponding token and VC is the quorum of view-change messages
that prove that the primary’s choice was valid.
A correct replica that receives a valid new-view message will change
its current view number to view (assuming it is greater than its current view
number) and send a 〈verify-response, view + 1, n, T, v, f〉~µv message to all
execution replicas, where f is a flag that indicates that the next batch should
be executed sequentially to ensure progress. Note that in this case the view
number has increased; this indicates that agreement was not reached and a
rollback to sequence number n is required.
Commit, State transfer and Rollback Upon receipt of r + 1 matching
verify-response messages, an execution replica e distinguishes three cases:
Commit If the view number has not increased and the agreed-upon token
matches the one e previously sent, then e marks that sequence number as
stable, garbage-collects any portions of the state that have now become
obsolete, and releases the responses computed from the requests in this
batch to the corresponding clients.
State transfer If the view number has not increased, but the token does not
match the one e previously sent, it means that this replica has diverged
from the agreed-upon state. To repair this divergence, e issues a state
transfer request to other replicas. This transfer is incremental: rather
than transferring the entire state, Eve transfers only the part that has
changed since the last stable sequence number. Incremental transfer,
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which uses the Merkle tree to identify what state needs to be transferred,
allows Eve to rapidly bring slow and diverging replicas up-to-date.
When performing a state transfer, the requesting replica sends its latest
committed sequence number and the responding replica only sends the
state difference from that sequence number to its own latest committed
sequence number. Before applying the state difference, the requesting
replica rolls back its own state to its latest committed sequence number,
undoing any changes that might contribute to the divergence. Finally,
to tolerate commission failures, the requesting replica checks that the
state sent by the responding replica matches the token T included in
the verify-response message. This check ensures that the replica
only accepts the state that the verification replicas agreed upon as the
committed state for the corresponding sequence number.
Rollback If the view number has increased, this means that agreement could
not be reached. Replica e discards any unexecuted requests and rolls
back its state to the sequence number indicated by the token T , while
verifying that its new state matches the token (else it initiates a state
transfer). The increased view number also implicitly rotates the execu-
tion primary. The replicas start receiving batches from the new primary
and, since the flag f was set, execute the first batch sequentially to en-
sure progress. In general, the flag does not need to trigger sequential
execution immediately; for example, a different implementation would
be to only employ sequential execution after k consecutive attempts at
parallel execution have led to divergence, for some—configurable—value
of k.
Read-only requests
Previous BFT protocols like PBFT and Zyzzyva [14, 43] handled read-only
requests differently: requests that do not modify the state are executed at
only 2f + 1—out of 3f + 1 total replicas—without going through the ordering
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phase, where f is the number of failures that the system can tolerate.
Perhaps surprisingly, Eve does not employ this so-called “read-only op-
timization”. There are three reasons why this optimization is not as compelling
in Eve.
First, Eve already executes requests in a reduced number of replicas:
Eve uses u + max(u, r) + 1 execution replicas, which corresponds to 2f + 1
replicas in the terminology of PBFT and Zyzzyva. Second, since Eve does not
perform agreement on the ordering of requests, but rather on the state and
outputs of the replicas, skipping the verification for read-only requests would
only provide minimal performance gains.
Finally, ensuring liveness in an asynchronous system with 2f+1 replicas,
requires waiting for no more than f + 1 responses. Since a normal request can
be committed with only max(u, r) + 1—i.e., f + 1—replicas, the quorum of
responses to a read-only request overlaps with the quorum of normal requests
in only one replica. Were that replica Byzantine, a read-only request could
return a stale result, violating the abstraction of a single correct server.
3.4.2 Synchronous primary-backup
A system configured for synchronous primary-backup has only two replicas
that are responsible for both execution and verification. While traditional
primary-backup employs passive replication, where the backup simply absorbs
state updates from the primary, Eve’s primary-backup configuration adopts
the active approach, where both replicas execute client requests independently.
The primary receives client requests and groups them into batches.
When a batch B is formed, it sends a 〈execute-batch, n,B, ND〉 message
to the backup, where n is the batch sequence number and ND is the data
needed for consistent execution of nondeterministic calls such as random()
and gettimeofday(). Both replicas apply the mixer to the batch, execute the
resulting parallelBatches, and compute the state token, as described in Section
3.2. The backup sends its token to the primary, which compares it to its own
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token. If the tokens match, the primary marks this sequence number as stable
and releases the responses to the clients. If the tokens differ, the primary rolls
back its state to the latest stable sequence number and notifies the backup to
do the same. To ensure progress, they execute the next batch sequentially.
If the primary crashes, the backup is eventually notified and assumes
the role of the primary. As long as the old primary is unavailable, the new pri-
mary will keep executing requests on its own. After a period of unavailability,
a replica uses incremental state transfer to bring its state up-to-date before
processing any new requests.
3.4.3 Tolerating concurrency bugs
A happy consequence of the execute-verify architecture is that even when con-
figured with the minimum number of replicas required to tolerate u omission
faults, Eve provides some protection against concurrency bugs.
Concurrency bugs can lead to both omission faults (e.g., a replica could
get stuck) and commission faults (e.g., a replica could produce an output
or transition to a state that is not part of its intended behavior). However,
faults due to concurrency bugs have two important properties that in general
cannot be assumed for Byzantine faults. First, since parallel execution is only
employed among execution threads, such faults only affect the application state
and outputs, and cannot corrupt the state of the replication protocol. Second,
they are easy to repair. If Eve detects a concurrency fault, it can repair the
fault via rollback and sequential re-execution.
It is important to remember that Eve does not need to know what the
intended behavior of the application is; it simply detects that some replicas
diverge from other replicas in their outputs and state transitions. This method
is particularly effective against concurrency bugs, because such bugs only occur
in a—typically small—subset of interleavings and are thus unlikely to affect a
large number of replicas simultaneously.
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Asynchronous case When configured with r = 0, Eve provides the follow-
ing guarantee:
Theorem 1 When configured with nE = 2u+ 1 and r = 0, asynchronous Eve
is safe, live, and correct despite up to u concurrency or omission faults.
Note that safety and liveness refer to the requirements of state machine replica-
tion—that the committed state and outputs at correct replicas match and that
requests eventually commit. Correctness refers to the state machine itself; a
committed state is correct if it is a state that can be reached by the state
machine in a fault-free run.
Proof sketch: The system is always safe and correct because the verifier re-
quires u+1 matching execution tokens to commit a batch. If there are at most
u concurrency faults and no other commission faults, then every committed
batch has at least one execution token produced by a correct replica.
The system is live because if a batch fails to gather u + 1 matching
tokens, the verifier forces the execution replicas to roll back and sequentially
re-execute. During sequential execution deterministic correct replicas do not
diverge; so, re-execution suffers at most u omission faults and produces at least
u+ 1 matching execution tokens, allowing the batch to commit.
When more than u correlated concurrency faults produce exactly the
same state and output, Eve still provides the safety and liveness properties of
state machine replication, but can no longer guarantee correctness of the state
machine itself.
Synchronous case When configured with just u+1 execution replicas, Eve
can continue to operate with one replica if u replicas fail by omission. In
such configurations, Eve does not have spare redundancy and can not mask
concurrency faults at the one remaining replica.
Extra protection during good intervals During good intervals when
there are no replica faults or timeouts other than those caused by concurrency
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bugs, Eve uses spare redundancy to boost its best-effort protection against
concurrency bugs to nE − 1 execution replicas in both the synchronous and
asynchronous cases.
For example, in the synchronous primary-backup case, when both exe-
cution replicas are alive, the primary receives both execution responses, and if
they do not match, it orders a rollback and sequential re-execution. Thus, dur-
ing a good interval this configuration masks one-replica concurrency failures.
We expect this to be the common case.
In both the synchronous and asynchronous case Eve, when configured
for r = 0, enters extra protection mode (EPM) after k consecutive batches for
which all nE execution replicas provided matching, timely responses. While
Eve is in EPM, after the verifiers receive the minimum number of execution
responses necessary for progress, they continue to wait for up to a short timeout
to receive all nE responses. If the verifiers receive all nE matching responses,
they commit the response. Otherwise, they order a rollback and sequential re-
execution. Then, if they receive nE matching responses within a short timeout,
they commit the response and remain in EPM. Conversely, if sequential re-
execution does not produce nE matching and timely responses, they suspect
a non-concurrency failure and exit EPM to ensure liveness by allowing the
system to make progress with fewer matching responses.
3.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation aims to answer the following questions:
• What is the throughput gain that Eve provides compared to a traditional
sequential execution approach?
• How does Eve’s performance compare to an unreplicated multithreaded
execution and alternative replication approaches?
• How is Eve’s performance affected by the mixer and by other workload
characteristics?
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• How efficient is Eve at masking concurrency bugs?
We address these questions by using a key-value store application and
the H2 Database Engine. We implemented a simple key-value store applica-
tion to perform microbenchmark measurements of Eve’s sensitivity to various
parameters. Specifically, we vary the amount of execution time required per
request, the size of the application objects and the accuracy of our mixer, in
terms of both false positives and false negatives. For the H2 Database Engine
we use an open-source implementation of the TPC-W benchmark [69, 70]. We
present the results of the browsing workload, which has more opportunities
for concurrency.
Our current prototype omits some of the features described above.
Specifically, although we implement the extra protection mode optimization
from Section 3.4.3 for synchronous primary-backup replication, we do not im-
plement it for our asynchronous configurations. Also, our current implementa-
tion does not handle applications that include objects for which Java’s finalize
method modifies state that needs to be consistent across replicas. Finally, our
current prototype only supports in-memory application state.
We run our microbenchmarks on an Emulab testbed with 14x 4-core
Intel Xeon @2.4 GHz, 4x 8-core Intel Xeon @2.66 GHz, and 2x 8-core hyper-
threaded Intel Xeon @1.6 GHz, connected with a 1 Gb Ethernet. We were able
to get limited access to 3x 16-core AMD Opteron @3.0 GHz and 2x 8-core Intel
Xeon L5420 @2.5 Ghz. We use the AMD machines as execution replicas to run
the TPC-W benchmark on the H2 Database Engine for both the synchronous
primary-backup and the asynchronous BFT configuration (Figure 3.3). For
the asynchronous BFT configuration we use 3 execution and 4 verifier nodes,
which are sufficient to tolerate 1 Byzantine fault (u = 1, r = 1). The L5420
machines are running Xen and we use them to perform our comparison with
Remus (Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11).
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3.5.1 H2 Database with TPC-W
Figures 3.3 demonstrates the performance of Eve for the H2 Database En-
gine [33] with the TPC-W browsing workload [69, 70]. We report the through-
put of Eve using an asynchronous BFT configuration (Eve-BFT) and a syn-
chronous active primary-backup configuration (Eve-PrimaryBackup). We com-
pare against the throughput achieved by an unreplicated server that uses
sequential execution regardless of the number of available hardware threads
(sequential). Note that this represents an upper bound of the performance
achievable by previous replication systems that use sequential execution [14,
18, 46, 52]. We also compare against the performance of an unreplicated server
that uses parallel execution.
With 16 execution threads, Eve achieves a speedup of 6.5x compared
to sequential execution. That approaches the 7.5x speedup achieved by an
unreplicated H2 Database server using 16 threads.
In both configurations and across all runs and for all data points, Eve
never needs to roll back. This suggests that our simple mixer never paral-
lelized requests it should have serialized. At the same time, the good speedup
indicates that it was adequately aggressive in identifying opportunities for
parallelism.
3.5.2 Microbenchmarks
In this section, we use a simple key-value store application to measure how
various parameters affect Eve’s performance. We only show the graphs for the
primary-backup configuration; the results for asynchronous replication are very
similar, because the verification stage has minimal impact on performance, as
Figure 3.3 shows. Except when noted, the default workload consumes 1 ms of
execution time per request, each request updates one application object, and
the application object size is 1 KB.
Figure 3.4 shows the impact of varying the CPU demand of each request.































Figure 3.3: The throughput of Eve running the TPC-W browsing workload
on the H2 Database Engine.
well, up to 12.5x on 16 threads compared to sequential execution. As the work-
load gets lighter, the overhead of Eve becomes more pronounced. Speedups
fall to 10x for 1 ms/request and to 3.3x for 0.1 ms/request. The 3.3x scaling
is partially an artifact of our inability to fully load the server with lightweight
requests. In our workload generator, clients have one outstanding request at a
time, thus requiring a high number of clients to saturate the servers; this causes
our servers to run out of sockets before they are fully loaded. We measure our
server CPU utilization during this experiment to be about 30%.
In Figure 3.4 we plot throughput speedup, so that trends are apparent.
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Figure 3.7: The impact of conflict probability and false positive rate on Eve’s
throughput.
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10.0K, 1242 for the 0.1 ms, 1 ms, 10 ms lines, respectively.
The next experiment explores the impact of the application object size
on the system throughput. We run the experiment using object sizes of 10 B,
1 KB, and 10 KB. Figure 3.5 shows the results. While the achieved through-
put scales well for object sizes of 10 B and 1 KB, its scalability decreases for
larger objects (10 KB). This is an artifact of the hashing library we use, as it
first copies the object before computing its hash: for large objects, this mem-
ory copy limits the achievable throughput. Note that in this figure we plot
throughput speedup rather than absolute throughput to better indicate the
trends across workloads. For reference, the absolute peak throughput values
in requests per second are 10.0K, 10.0K, 5.6K for the 10 B, 1 KB, 10 KB lines,
respectively.
Next, we evaluate Eve’s sensitivity to inaccurate mixers. Specifically,
we explore the limits of tolerance to false negatives (misclassifying conflicting
requests as non-conflicting) and false positives (misclassifying non-conflicting
requests as conflicting). The effect of these parameters is measured as a func-
tion of the pairwise conflict probability: the probability that two requests
have a conflict. In practice, we achieve this by having each request modify
one object and then varying the number of application objects. For example,
to produce a 1% conflict chance, we create 100 objects. Similarly, a 1% false
negative rate means that each pair of conflicting requests has a 1% chance of
being classified as non-conflicting.
Figure 3.6 shows the effect of false negatives on throughput. First notice
that, even with no false negatives, the throughput drops as the pairwise conflict
chance increases because of the decrease of available parallelism. For example,
if a batch has 100 requests and each request has a 10% chance of conflicting
with each other request, then a perfect mixer is likely to divide the batch into
about 10 parallelBatches, each with about 10 requests.
When we add false negatives, we add rollbacks, and the number of roll-
backs increases with both the underlying conflict rate and the false negative
rate. Notice that the impact builds more quickly than one might expect be-
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cause there is essentially a birthday “paradox”—if we have a 1% conflict rate
and a 1% false negative rate, then the probability that any pair of conflicting
requests be misclassified is 1 in 10000. But in a batch of 100 requests, each of
these requests has about a 1% chance of being party to a conflict, which means
there is about a 39% chance that a batch of 100 requests contain an undetected
conflict. Furthermore, with a 1% conflict rate, the batch will be divided into
only a few parallelBatches, so there is a good chance that conflicting requests
will land in the same parallelBatch. In fact, in this case we measure 1 rollback
per 7 parallelBatches executed. Despite this high conflict rate and this high
number of rollbacks, Eve achieves a speedup of 2.6x compared to sequential
execution.
Figure 3.7 shows the effect of false positives on throughput. As ex-
pected, increased false positive ratios can lead to lower throughput, but the
effect is not as significant as for false negatives. The reason is simple: false
positives reduce the opportunities for parallel execution, but they don’t incur
any additional overhead.
From these experiments, we conclude that Eve does require a good
mixer to achieve good performance. This requirement does not particularly
worry us. We found it easy to build a mixer that (to the best of our knowledge)
detects all conflicts and still allows for a good amount of parallelism. Others
have had similar experience [44]. Although creating perfect mixers may be
difficult in some cases, we speculate that it will often be feasible to construct
mixers with the low false negative rates and modest false positive rates needed
by Eve.
3.5.3 Failure and recovery
In Figure 3.8, we demonstrate Eve’s ability to mask and recover from failures.
In the primary-backup configuration we run an experiment where we kill the
primary node n1 at t = 30 seconds and recover it at t = 60 seconds (by






















Figure 3.8: Throughput during node crash and recovery for an Eve primary-
backup configuration.
the new secondary (n1) at t = 90 seconds and recover it at t = 120 seconds.
We observe that after the first failure the throughput drops to zero until the
backup realizes that the primary is dead after a timeout of four seconds.3 The
backup then assumes the role of the primary and starts processing requests.
The throughput during this period is higher because the new primary knows
that the other node is crashed and does not send any messages to it. At t = 60,
the first node recovers, and the throughput drops to zero for about one second
while the newly recovered node catches up. Then the throughput returns to
its original value. The process repeats when n1 crashes again at t = 90 seconds
and recovers at t = 120 seconds.
3.5.4 Concurrency faults
To evaluate Eve’s ability to mask concurrency faults, we use a primary-backup
configuration with 16 execution threads and run the TPC-W browsing work-
load on the H2 Database Engine with various mixers. H2 has a previously
undiagnosed concurrency bug in which a row counter is not incremented prop-
erly when multiple requests access the same table in read uncommitted mode.
Our standard mixer completely masks this bug because it does not let re-
3One could use a fast failure detector [50] to achieve sub-second detection.
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Group all 1% FN 0.5% FN 0.1% FN Original Mixer
Times bug manifested 73 51 29 4 0
Fixed with rollback 60 38 18 3 0
All identical (not masked) 13 13 11 1 0
Throughput 1104 1233 1240 1299 1322
Figure 3.9: Effectiveness of Eve in masking concurrency bugs when various
mixers are used.
quests that modify the same table execute in parallel. By introducing less
accurate mixers we explore how well Eve’s second line of defense—the verifi-
cation stage—works in masking this bug.
Figure 3.9 shows the number of times that the bug manifested in one
or both replicas. When the bug manifests only in one replica, Eve detects
that the replicas have diverged and repairs the damage by rolling back and
reexecuting sequentially. If the bug happens to manifest in both replicas in
the same way, Eve will not detect it.
The first column shows the results when there is a trivial aggressive
mixer that places all requests of batch i in the same parallelBatch. In this
case, all requests that arrive together in a batch are allowed to execute in
parallel. Naturally, this case has the highest number of bug manifestations.
We observe that even when the mixer does no filtering at all, Eve masks 82%
of the instances where the bug manifests. In the remaining 18% of the cases,
the bug manifested in the same way in both replicas and was not corrected
by Eve. In columns 2 through 4, we introduce mixers with high rates of
false negatives. This results in fewer manifestations of the bug, with Eve still
masking the majority of those manifestations. In the fifth column, we show
results for our original mixer, which (to the best of our knowledge) does not
introduce false negatives. In this case, the bug does not manifest at all.




Remus [23] is a primary-backup system that uses Virtual Machines (VMs) to
send modified state from the primary to the backup. An advantage of this
approach is that it is simple and requires no modifications to the application.
A drawback of this approach is that it aggressively utilizes network resources
to keep the backup consistent with the primary. The issue is aggravated by
two properties of Remus. First, Remus does not make fine-grain distinctions
between state that is required for the state machine and temporary state.
Second, Remus operates on the VM level, which forces it to send entire pages,
rather than just the modified objects. Also, because Remus is using passive
replication, it tolerates a narrower range of faults than Eve. Our experiments
show that, despite Eve’s stronger guarantees, it outperforms Remus by a factor
of 4.7x, while using two orders of magnitude less network bandwidth.
Figure 3.10 shows the throughput achieved by Remus and Eve on the
browsing workload of the TPC-W benchmark. We also show the latency and
throughput of the unreplicated system for the same workload. Both systems
run the H2 Database Engine on Xen and using a 2-node (primary-backup)
configuration. Remus achieves a maximum throughput of 235 requests per
second, while Eve peaks at 1225 requests per second. Remus crashes for loads
higher than 235 requests per second, as its bandwidth requirements approach
the capacity of the network, as Figure 3.11 shows. In contrast with Remus, Eve
executes requests independently at each replica and does not need to propagate
state modifications over the network. The practical consequence is that Eve
uses significantly less bandwidth, achieves higher throughput, and provides
stronger guarantees compared to a passive replication approach like Remus.
Of course, the increased performance and stronger guarantees do not come for
free. To achieve them, Eve pays the price of having to manually identify the
relevant parts of the application state and abstract away the irrelevant ones;




















Figure 3.10: The latency and throughput of Remus and Eve running the H2
Database Engine on Xen. Both systems use a 2-node configuration. The




























Figure 3.11: The bandwidth consumption of Remus and Eve for the experi-
ment shown in Figure 3.10.
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3.5.6 Latency and batching
Figure 3.10 provides some insight in Eve’s tradeoff between latency and through-
put. When Eve is not saturated, its latency is only marginally higher than
that of an unreplicated server. As the load increases, Eve’s latency increases
somewhat, until it finally spikes up at the saturation point, at a throughput of
1225 requests per second; the unreplicated server’s latency spikes up at around
1470 requests per second. To keep its latency low while maintaining a high
peak throughput, Eve uses a dynamic batching scheme: the batch size de-
creases when the demand is low (providing good latency), and increases when
the system starts becoming saturated, in order to leverage as much parallelism
as possible.
3.6 Conclusion
Eve is a new execute-verify architecture that allows state machine replication
to scale to multi-core servers. By revisiting the role of determinism in replica
coordination, Eve enables new SMR protocols that for the first time allow
replicas to interleave requests nondeterministically and execute independently.
This unprecedented combination is critical to both Eve’s scalability and to its
generality, as Eve can be configured to tolerate both omission and commission
failures in both synchronous and asynchronous settings. As an added bonus,
Eve’s unconventional architecture can be easily tuned to provide low-cost,






Interaction between services is an integral part of today’s computing. Services,
large and small, are typically used in conjunction with other services to build
large systems, like large-scale key-value stores [15, 25, 35], online shopping cen-
ters [4], data processing systems [24, 34], etc. In such environments, services
frequently need to issue requests to other services. Such interactions take place
both among services belonging to different domains, as well as among com-
ponents of a single infrastructure service. For example, when an online store
processes a client checkout, it issues a nested request—i.e., a request that is
issued while the original checkout request is being processed—to the client’s
credit card service, asking for a certain amount of money to be blocked. Sim-
ilarly, a web server processing client HTTP requests frequently needs to issue
nested requests to a back-end database.
Infrastructure services follow a similar pattern; such services typically
consist of multiple components that work together to provide a high-level
service. For example, Figure 4.1 shows the components of Google’s Photon
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Figure 4.1: Components of Google’s Photon system within a single datacenter.
system [5] for processing ad clicks—their main source of revenue. Photon
consists of four main components, which regularly interact with each other
to provide the required functionality. Similarly, the HBase key-value store
consists of multiple components, some of which need to interact with as many
as three other components in order to process client requests.
The challenge To make such services highly available, one might hope to
use the tried abstraction of a Replicate State Machine. After all, if each of
these services can be replicated so that it provides the abstraction of a single
correct server, it should be easy to get these correct servers to interact with
each other. In principle there is indeed nothing that prevents the RSM ab-
straction from being applicable in this setting. In practice, however, 40 years
of applying RSM to the client-server model have led to lack of attention toward
the challenges involved in allowing RSMs to communicate with one another ef-
ficiently. In particular, RSM implementations that use the client-server model
assume that the replicated service can process requests independently and is
therefore allowed to choose any strategy to process requests that does not
violate the single-correct-server abstraction.
Fundamentally, maintaining this abstraction in an interactive setting
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is harder than in the traditional client-server model, because the abstrac-
tion must be maintained towards other services as well; services that can be
exposed—through the means of nested requests—to intermediate states of the
replicated service.
Hence, execution of requests is no longer independent in this setting:
the way in which requests are processed directly affects the states that are
exposed to other services. Below, we describe the consequences of two popular
execution modes that are used by most replication protocols to achieve replica
convergence.
Sequential execution Most replication protocols require replicas to execute
requests sequentially to ensure that correct replicas make the same state
transitions and produce the same output. When services need to make
nested requests to other services, however, the requirement of sequential
execution prevents replicas from executing any other request while a
nested request is in flight, forcing them to remain idle for long periods
of time, causing a significant throughput reduction.
Speculative execution Some replication protocols employ speculation to
achieve high throughput [40, 43]. For example, Eve speculatively exe-
cutes requests in parallel, and then verifies whether replicas indeed ar-
rived at the same state. When the speculation fails, the service must
roll back its state to a consistent checkpoint. If, however, a service (A)
had already sent some nested requests to another service B, the state of
B is now inconsistent, since it has executed requests that may never be
issued when A re-executes the requests that caused the misspeculation.
In this chapter we present Adam, a replication library that allows repli-
cated services to interact with other services via nested requests. Adam’s de-
sign focuses on addressing the performance repercussions of sequential execu-
tion—a requirement that lies at the heart of all active replication protocols4—
4Even in the execute-verify architecture, sequential execution is required to guarantee
replica convergence, when speculation fails (see Section 3.4).
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as well as the correctness consequences of speculative execution, which is em-
ployed by replication protocols such as Eve and Zyzzyva to achieve high per-
formance [40, 43].
4.2 System model
Adam assumes a system model similar to Eve. Adam applies to both syn-
chronous and asynchronous systems and can be configured to tolerate failures
of any severity, from crashes to Byzantine faults.
Similar to Eve, in Adam we primarily target asynchronous environments
where the network can arbitrarily delay, reorder, or lose messages without im-
periling safety. For liveness, we require the existence of synchronous intervals
during which the network is well-behaved and messages sent between two cor-
rect nodes are received and processed with bounded delay.
Each of the services participating in the Adam protocol can be config-
ured separately, depending on their fault tolerance requirements; i.e., using
their own u and r parameters. Each service is configured to be live, i.e., pro-
vide a response to client requests, despite a total of up to u failures, whether
of omission or commission, and to ensure that all responses accepted by cor-
rect clients are correct despite up to r commission failures and any number of
omission failures [18]. As in Eve, we assume that failures do not break cryp-
tographic primitives; i.e., a faulty node can never produce a correct node’s
MAC.
4.3 The Adam protocol
The Adam replication protocol stands on the shoulders of many previous pro-
tocols [14, 18, 40, 46, 78]. At a high level, the basic operation of Adam is not
different from these protocols: clients send requests to a designated leader
replica, which forwards the requests to all other replicas. These replicas
process the requests and send their replies back to the client. If there are
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max (u, r)+1 matching replies, the client accepts the reply. One could choose
to implement this high-level description with either of the two architectures we
have described so far: the traditional agree-execute architecture or Eve’s new
execute-verify architecture. We choose to focus on the execute-verify archi-
tecture, since it encompasses both speculative and sequential execution—the
latter to guarantee replica convergence, when speculation fails. Additionally,
the execute-verify architecture can be used to emulate the behavior of the
agree-execute architecture by employing sequential execution at all times; the
verification phase effectively becomes an agreement on the order of requests.
Section 4.3.1 discusses how Adam addresses the performance inefficiencies as-
sociated with sequential execution when services interact, and Section 4.3.2
discusses how Adam addresses the inconsistencies that arise from using spec-
ulative execution in this setting.
4.3.1 Deterministic pipelining
Adam employs deterministic pipelining as an alternative to sequential exe-
cution: its goal is to guarantee replica convergence without forcing replicas
to remain idle while nested requests are in flight. The only assumption we
make is that the leader replica organizes client requests in batches before for-
warding them to other replicas of the same group, where each batch is an
ordered sequence of requests. This assumption is trivial to satisfy in leader-
based replication systems. While deterministic pipelining has the same goal
as sequential execution—replica convergence—it does not provide the same
end-to-end guarantees as sequential execution.
Previous systems which employed sequential execution [1, 14, 16, 21, 43,
46] typically provide linearizability of requests [36]. At first glance, lineariz-
ability may seem to be an integral part of the single-correct-node abstraction;
while that may have been true in a world where execution was only sequential,
it is no longer true when a single node can execute requests in parallel. Even
in a world of multithreaded execution, however, linearizability is still desir-
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able in some settings, because of the strong and intuitively simple semantics
it provides. These strong semantics, however, come at a certain performance
cost, which is often unnecessary. Enforcing linearizability at the level of the
replication library appears to be yet another instance where the intricacies of
implementation have seeped into the specification.
This seems a situation ripe for applying the end-to-end argument [64]:
applications that require linearizability can enforce it end-to-end, but the un-
derlying abstraction should not. Our deterministic pipelining mode of execu-
tion is a first attempt at freeing the abstraction from the obligation to provide
overly restrictive properties, yielding a significant performance increase. De-
terministic pipelining is based on a simple insight: sequential execution, while
sufficient to provide replica convergence, is not necessary—even when the tra-
ditional agree-execute architecture is used. Sequential execution is merely an
instance of a deterministic schedule; in fact, any deterministic schedule is suf-
ficient to provide replica convergence.
Deterministic pipelining works as follows. Each replica is configured to
have the same number of execution threads, N . When a replica receives a
batch of requests, it starts executing the first request on the first thread. The
execution of that thread will only be stopped in two cases: a) when it finishes
executing a request and no other request is available in this batch for this
thread; or b) after it sends a nested request to another service. When either
of these halting events occur, the corresponding thread will be paused, the
second thread will become active and will start executing the second request.
Similarly, every thread will yield execution to the next thread when a halting
event occurs. This process is repeated until the N th thread yields, at which
point the first thread becomes active again, in a round-robin manner. Despite
pipelining, the active thread may still remain idle for some time, while the
response to its nested request is in flight. This idling can be reduced by
increasing the depth of the pipeline. Note, finally, that when a thread finishes
executing a request, it does not yield if another request is available; it starts
executing that request.
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Any thread that resumes execution is in one of two states, depending
on the kind of halting event that caused it to yield. If the thread has reached
the end of the batch, the thread is considered stopped and does not participate
in the execution of this batch anymore—i.e. it yields immediately and is not
considered for reactivation until the next batch starts. If the halting event was
the sending of a nested request, then the thread waits until the response to that
nested request arrives. If the response arrives before the thread becomes active,
it is cached so that the thread can retrieve it immediately upon activation.
Note that the order in which requests are processed does not depend on the
timing of the responses, making the schedule deterministic across replicas.
Avoiding deadlocks
An undesirable side-effect of enforcing this round-robin schedule among half-
finished requests is that it raises the possibility of introducing deadlocks if
some suspended threads hold exclusive locks when they yield execution. In
Figure 4.2, the first request acquires a lock on x and then yields to the second
request, while still holding that lock. If the second request tries to acquire the
same lock, a deadlock occurs: the first request will keep waiting for the second
to yield, while the second request will keep waiting for the first to release the
lock.
To address this side-effect, we impose an intermediate layer of control
over the lock acquisitions. Specifically, we replace the lock(x) and unlock(x)
calls with trylock(x) and release(x), respectively. The pseudocode for
trylock and release is shown in Figure 4.3. The use of trylock prevents
deadlocks from being introduced by ensuring that, if a lock is already acquired,
no other request will be blocked waiting for that lock to be released. Instead,
that request will immediately yield control of the execution to the next request.
An immediate consequence of the above discussion is that failing to
acquire a lock can cause a thread to yield. An unsuccessful trylock is then
a halting event, just like sending a nested request and reaching the end of a
request. Table 4.1 summarizes all halting events that will cause a thread to
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Figure 4.2: An example of how enforcing the deterministic pipeline schedule














Figure 4.3: Pseudocode for the trylock and release function calls.
yield.
4.3.2 Taming speculation
As we discussed earlier, employing speculative execution in an environment
where a service A can send nested requests to another service B can cause
correctness violations. Consider two services A and B , that use the Eve repli-
cation library. When speculation fails at A—because of non-matching tokens
at the end of a batch—the state of A must be rolled back; unfortunately, any
nested requests that were sent as part of executing the batch have already
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Event name Summary
end batch The request has executed fully and no more
requests are available in this batch
send nested request A nested request is sent to another service
fail lock The request tried to acquire a lock that is al-
ready acquired by another request
Table 4.1: Events that cause a request to yield control of the execution to the
next request.
been executed at B . To make matters worse, the effects of that execution may
have been observed by other clients of B . As a result, even rolling back the
state of B may not be sufficient to repair this inconsistency.
The reason for such correctness violations is that nested requests are
sent half-way through the execution of a request or, more specifically, at a time
when the speculation is still unresolved: the requests are therefore contingent
on the speculation succeeding.
We propose two approaches to address this problem: the first requires
no modification to the backend service, while the second does require small
modifications to the backend service in exchange for lower request latency.
A1: resolve speculation The first approach treats the sending of a nested
request as an output commit. To prevent inconsistencies due to misspec-
ulation, we resolve the speculation before the nested request is sent out.
Resolving the speculation in the middle of executing a batch is, of course,
not straightforward.
A2: make speculation explicit The second approach does not try to re-
solve the speculation before sending nested requests: instead, it simply
ensures that the nested requests carry explicit information about the
speculative state they depend on. This information can be used by ser-
vice B to determine whether enough replicas of A agree on their specu-
lative state. In this approach, service A uses service B as its verification
stage.
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Each approach has its own merits. A1 is transparent, since it does not
require any changes to service B . As such, it is preferred when service A inter-
acts with several services, especially if those services are not replicated to begin
with. A2 requires some modification at service B , but, as we describe below,
it is more efficient; service A does not need to perform an extra verification
phase before sending nested requests to B .
A1: resolve speculation
In Eve, speculation can only be resolved at the end of the batch, which serves
as a deterministically identifiable point at which a token of the state and
responses of each replica can be computed and verified. This mechanism is
obviously no longer sufficient for our case, as it resolves speculation after it has
been exposed to other services. Note, however, that verification of convergence
does not necessarily have to occur at the end of the batch: all that is required
is that the verification point be deterministically identifiable across all correct
replicas.
Fortunately, the end of the batch is not the only deterministically iden-
tifiable point in the execution. The sending of a nested request can serve the
same purpose: nested requests are sent at the same point in the execution,
across all replicas. Our goal is then to resolve speculation by leveraging the
existence of those deterministically identifiable points.
The execution stage proceeds in the same way as in Eve with respect
to batching and mixing. The primary execution replica collects client requests
and forms batches of requests, which it forwards to all other execution replicas.
Each replica then applies a deterministic and application-specific mixer, which
partitions each batch into the same sequence of parallelBatches—groups of re-
quests that the mixer believes can be executed in parallel with little likelihood
that different interleavings will produce diverging results at distinct replicas.
This is where things start diverging from the way Eve executes requests.
To aid in our description, we will again use the notion of halting events,
similar to our deterministic pipelining technique. In this case, the halting
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Figure 4.4: An example of four threads processing a parallelBatch. Thick
vertical lines represent the sending of nested requests. The execution of the
parallelBatch is divided by the two walls into three parts, each colored with an
increasingly dark shade of gray. Note that the fourth thread does not execute
any requests during the third part, since it has already reached the end of the
parallelBatch.
events are two: the sending of a nested request and reaching the end of a
parallelBatch.
Consider the execution of a parallelBatch of requests using N execution
threads. Initially, up to N requests start being executed, one by each execution
thread. When every one of these requests reaches its first halting event—either
because it needs to send a nested request or because it just finished executing
a request and there are no more requests in the current parallelBatch—we say
that the execution has hit a wall. Note that, depending on how often requests
trigger nested requests, the execution can hit a sequence of walls while pro-
cessing a single parallelBatch. For example, in Figure 4.4 the execution hits
two walls before reaching the end of the parallelBatch. When a thread hits the
wall, its execution is paused until all threads hit the wall. When the halting
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event is a send, execution is paused immediately before the nested request is
sent. When all its N threads hit the current wall, a replica calculates a token
that represents its state and any responses made by requests in this parallel-
Batch, using a mechanism similar to Eve, but with two notable differences.
First, the token must also represent any nested requests that are about to be
sent out, as these are also affected by the speculation in the execution. Second,
the application state must also include the entire application stack—function
calls and local variables—which is necessary to perform rollback and state
transfer, as we discuss below.
When the token is calculated, the execution replicas, as in Eve, send
it for verification: each replica sends a 〈verify, view, n, T, e〉~µe message to
all verifier replicas, where n is a sequence number that uniquely identifies the
current wall. The verification replicas respond with the last agreed-upon token,
along with the current view number; an increased view number indicates that
no agreement was reached and a rollback is required. Upon receipt of r + 1
matching verify-response messages, an execution replica e distinguishes
three cases:
Commit If the view number has not increased and the agreed-upon token
matches the one e previously sent, then e considers the execution up until
n to be committed. It can now send any nested requests that were about
to be sent before execution was paused. After those nested requests have
been sent, the execution replica resumes all threads. Any thread that
was paused at a send halting event will resume execution right after that
send. Note that threads do not need to receive the responses to nested
requests synchronously; a thread can continue executing until it needs to
access that response, at which point it will make a readResponse() call,
which will block until the corresponding response becomes available.
Correct replicas will send their nested requests to the primary execution
replica of B , the receiving service. That primary replica treats those
requests as a single client request—i.e., it does not process that request
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more than once—with the difference that it waits for a quorum of size
max(uA,rA)+1 of matching requests before it starts processing the re-
quest, where uA and rA are the configuration parameters of the sending
service, A. Similarly, after B has finished processing the request, correct
execution replicas of B will send the response to all execution replicas
of A, which will in turn wait for a quorum of max(uB,rB)+1 matching
responses, where uB and rB are the configuration parameters of service
B .
Rollback If the view number has increased, then agreement could not be
reached. Replica e discards any unexecuted requests and rolls back its
state to the sequence number indicated by the token T , while verifying
that its new state matches the token (else it initiates a state transfer).
The main difference from Eve is that the replica does not necessarily roll
back to the beginning of the parallelBatch, but rather to the last com-
mitted wall, which could correspond to some requests being partially
executed. Rolling back to the middle of a request requires more than
restoring the corresponding application state: one must restore the ap-
plication stack that was active when the wall was reached. To that end,
the replicas record the application stack as part of the application state.
As in Eve, the increased view number also implicitly rotates the execu-
tion primary. In Adam, however, if a batch has been partially executed
the new primary does not propose new contents for that batch; replicas
execute the remaining requests in that batch sequentially and then start
receiving new batches from the primary. To ensure that a malicious
primary cannot prevent the system from making progress indefinitely
by sending a different batch of requests to different replicas, the batch
contents are included in the state that is verified. That way, if a wall
that corresponds to a partially executed batch is committed, replicas are
guaranteed to have implicitly reached agreement on the contents of the
partially executed batch; they can therefore always make progress by
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executing requests within that batch sequentially.
State transfer If the view number has not increased, but the token does not
match the one e previously sent, then this replica has diverged from the
agreed-upon state. To repair this divergence, the replica issues an incre-
mental state transfer request to other replicas, as in Eve. The difference
is that the transferred state contains also a) the application stack, since it
is possible that the transferred state corresponds to a wall that includes
partially executed requests; and b) the contents of the partially executed
batch. The replica then restores not only the application state, but also
the application stack and the requests that are yet to be executed as
well. The details of how the application stack is recorded, rolled back
and restored in our prototype are described in Section 4.4.
Avoiding deadlocks Similarly to deterministic pipelining, the above pro-
tocol has the potential of introducing deadlocks. Figure 4.5 demonstrates an
example of such a deadlock. Requests 1 and 2 belong to the same parallel-
Batch and both try to acquire the same lock. If the first request acquires the
lock, the second one will be blocked until the lock is released. The lock will
never be released, however, since the first request must wait until the second
request reaches the wall before proceeding to execute its second part, which
would release the lock.
The reason why this type of deadlock is introduced lies in the fact that
requests can send out nested requests while holding exclusive locks, thereby
creating a two-way dependency with another request of the same parallelBatch
that waits to acquire the same lock. We detect such deadlocks by using a
timeout. When such a timeout occurs at replica e, we perform a rollback
at e and start re-executing requests in that parallelBatch sequentially. Note
that other replicas may not necessarily roll back, too, as these deadlocks are
subject to races and are not deterministically triggered. This could lead to a
situation where the remaining replicas successfully reach the wall and produce
enough matching tokens to commit that wall. In that case, e will eventually
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Figure 4.5: An example of how a deadlock can arise when two requests that
belong to the same parallelBatch attempt to acquire the same lock.
realize—upon reception of the appropriate verify-response messages—that
it has diverged from the other replicas and will request a state transfer from
one of these replicas.
Fortunately, the root cause of these deadlocks—sending out nested re-
quests while holding exclusive locks—is not very likely to occur in practice.
Programmers typically avoid holding exclusive locks while performing time-
consuming tasks, such as calls to remote services. Additionally, even when
such exclusive locks are held for some requests, because of necessity or ne-
glect, the mixer can be designed to avoid placing requests that might acquire
the same locks in the same parallelBatch. We therefore believe that even a
conservative timeout should be enough to deal with the rather uncommon
circumstance where a request acquires a lock while making a nested request
to another service, while another request in the same parallelBatch tries to
acquire that same lock.
A2: make speculation explicit
This optimization is based on the insight that sending a speculative nested
request to another service is acceptable if that service can resolve the specu-
lation on its own. Instead of resolving speculation before making an output
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commit to another service, we allow such output commits to be speculative—
but only if they carry an explicit description of the speculative condition on
which they depend. This optimization can have a significant benefit with re-
spect to request latency, since the middle service does not need to perform
an extra round of verification before sending the nested requests; the backend
service can perform that verification on behalf of the middle service.
The protocol for this approach proceeds just like A1 with respect to
batching and mixing. We again use the notion of the wall, executing each
request until it reaches a halting event, and calculating the application state
token when all threads reach the wall. Instead of sending that token for
verification, however, we simply include it in any nested requests that are
sent to the backend service, B , along with the corresponding token for the
previous wall. A nested request has the form 〈req, op, t, c, e, T 〉~µc,r , where op
is the operation that should be performed, t is a timestamp that can be used
instead of calls to gettimeofday to ensure convergence among replicas, c is the
client id, e is an identifier for this replica, and T is a token that contains a) the
wall sequence number n; b) a checksum s of the current state and generated
responses; and c) a checksum h of the state and responses generated for wall
n-1.
The primary execution replica of B , just like in the first approach, gath-
ers a quorum of max(uA, rA)+1 matching requests. If such a quorum is found,
the execution replicas of B process the requests taking the—by now familiar—
steps of batching, mixing, execution, and verification. Recall, however, that
the token sent for verification includes a checksum for both the current and the
previous sequence number, to prevent inconsistent histories from being com-
mitted. In this approach, when the execution replicas of B send a verify mes-
sage, they need to include the token they received from service A. The verify
message has therefore the following form: 〈verify, view, n, TA, TB, e〉~µe .
The verification of service B , in addition to verifying that the h check-
sum of TB matches the last committed token for B , must also perform the
same check for the h checksum of TA. To do that, the verification stage of B
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must always be aware of the last token committed by service A. To prevent a
complicated protocol where the verification stages of A and B exchange infor-
mation about which tokens are committed, we simply have service A send all
verify messages to the verification stage of B , which must now store the last
committed token and view number for both services. Hence, in this approach
A does not need to have its own verification replicas.
If the verification at B is successful, the execution replicas of B send
the responses to the nested request to all execution replicas of A, including the
token TA that was accepted and the corresponding view number. An execution
replica of A that receives a quorum of max(uB, rB)+1 such messages implicitly
knows that TA is the verified token, and takes the appropriate action—commit
or state transfer—depending on whether its own token matches TA. If the
verification at B is unsuccessful, the verification replicas of B send a verify-
response message to all execution replicas of A and B , causing both services
to roll back to their last committed wall, respectively.
If the primary execution replica of B receives nEA−max(uA, rA)+1 mu-
tually non-matching requests, where nEA is the number of execution replicas of
A, the primary replica of B sends a special verify message to the verification
stage, notifying it of the divergence at A. The verification stage then sends
a verify-response message to all execution replicas of A, causing them to
roll back to the last committed wall.
To avoid ignoring requests indefinitely because of a malicious primary
replica, we take measures similar to Eve’s. The verification replicas of B
propose a view change if the commit rate is not high enough. Additionally,
the execution replicas of A, just like any client in Eve, resend nested requests to
all execution replicas of B if they receive no response within a timeout. Those
replicas then forward the requests to the primary and expect it to include
those requests in an upcoming batch within a given timeout; otherwise, they
stop participating, eventually causing the verification replicas to perform a
view change.
The approach of making speculation explicit can reduce request latency,
62
as it saves one verification phase and the corresponding messages between
execution and verification. This reduced latency, however, comes at the cost
of complexity, since the two services are no longer separate and independent,
but must be designed and maintained as a whole. Hence, this approach is
primarily targeting environments where both services are part of the same
administrative domain.
4.4 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of Adam in Java. The codebase of the
Adam prototype descends from the Eve codebase, with modifications made
in the parts where the design of Eve and Adam diverge. Most notably, these
changes affect the following parts of the code.
Replicated client Since the middle service of Adam functions as a repli-
cated client to the backend service, our prototype includes the necessary code
to support quorum gathering of nested requests at the backend service, as well
as quorum gathering of responses at the middle service.
Nested request sequence numbers A subtle implementation problem is
that of assigning sequence numbers to nested requests. The middle service
in Adam functions like a client for the backend service. As such, its requests
must have a sequence number that increases by one with every new request.
However, when multiple threads are executing in parallel, some of which need
to issue nested requests and some do not, it becomes very hard, if not impos-
sible, to assign those request sequence numbers in a deterministic way across
all replicas. We therefore create a separate client for each of our N execu-
tion threads. To ensure that each thread is assigned the same requests across
all replicas, we no longer assign requests to threads in a first-come-first-serve
fashion, but rather preassign requests to each thread before the parallelBatch
is executed, using a round-robin algorithm. Using this approach, each thread
63
can independently generate request sequence numbers that increase by one
with each new request and are consistent across all replicas.
The wall, rollback, and state transfer The hardest part of the Adam
prototype is the implementation of the wall, the ability to roll back to a pre-
vious wall, and to implement state transfer that can bring another replica to
the correct wall. To implement rollback in Eve, it is sufficient to undo the
uncommitted changes to the application state, since the execution will restart
at the beginning of the batch. Instead, in Adam the execution will have to
restart at the last committed wall, which usually involves resuming the exe-
cution of some half-finished requests. It is therefore not sufficient to roll back
the application state; local variables as well as the entire stack must be reset
appropriately.
To implement such functionality, we use the notion of a continuation:
a data structure that represents the computational process at a given point
in the process’s execution. Unfortunately, Java does not have native support
for continuations. Instead, we use the open source Javaflow library, which
provides the basic continuation functionality. Specifically, the Javaflow API
includes two calls, Suspend() and ContinueWith(). When a thread calls Sus-
pend(), Javaflow starts iterating through all stack frames and saving them into
a continuation object, stopping only when it reaches the stack frame where
ContinueWith() is called; and finally returning the continuation object. Con-
tinueWith() takes a continuation object as an argument and causes the thread
to resume execution from that continuation, by restoring all stack frames in
the continuation and resuming execution from the last instruction after the
Suspend() was called.
Adam uses this continuation functionality in the following way: when
a new parallelBatch is started, each thread calls ContinueWith(), to mark the
beginning of a “clean” execution. Whenever a thread hits the wall, it calls
Suspend() which returns to where the initial ContinueWith is called and re-
turns the appropriate continuation object. At this point, the main coordinator
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thread waits for all execution threads to call Suspend (i.e., hit the wall), and
then starts calculating the token that will be send for verification. Depend-
ing on the verification results, the coordinator thread will ask each execution
thread to call ContinueWith using the appropriate continuation object as its
argument: the one returned by the last Suspend, if verification succeeds; or the
one returned by the previous Suspend()—or null if no such Suspend exists—if
the verification failed.
While Javaflow provides us with a basic continuation functionality, it
is not sufficient for implementing state rollback to a given wall. In particular,
adapting Javaflow to fit our needs raised two problems. First, the Javaflow con-
tinuations only store shallow copies—i.e., references—to application objects.
Hence, if an object is modified between walls n− 1 and n, then simply rolling
back to the previous (n− 1) version of the reference will not actually roll back
the modifications to the object. Instead, in Adam we combine the continuation
functionality with the Merkle tree implementation, keeping a deep copy of the
application objects that are referenced by a continuation. Keeping deep copies
that are versioned through the Merkle tree module has the additional benefit
that it simplifies the implementation of state transfer. When a state transfer is
required, the replica sends a serialized version of the appropriate continuation,
which is sufficient—since it contains deep copies of the required objects—to
bootstrap the requesting replica. The second problem we met is that the stack
keeps references to all objects used in the execution. Remember that in Eve
we discussed the need to abstract away parts of the state that might not be
identical byte-wise, even though their respective replicas have not diverged.
Such state includes the state used by the replication library itself—e.g., the
replica id, which is by definition different across all replicas—local state like
IP address, or timestamps that may be used for logging. Adam takes an ap-
proach similar to Eve: we manually annotate such objects to prevent them
from being included in the hash calculation of the state.
Our current prototype omits some of the features described above.
Specifically, it does not implement approach A2 of making speculation explicit;
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our experiments in Section 4.5 are performed using approach A1. Addition-
ally, our prototype does not implement the deadlock recovery mechanisms;
we have not yet found need for this mechanism, as the applications we have
experimented with do not acquire locks while nested requests are in flight.
4.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation of Adam aims to answer the following questions:
• What is the throughput gain of using deterministic pipelining compared
to a traditional sequential execution?
• How does Adam’s performance when using speculative execution com-
pare to sequential execution?
We address these questions by using the key-value store application we
presented in the evaluation of Eve (Section 3.5). In our experiments clients
send requests to a key-value store A. Each request requires some amount
of execution time, modifies one key-value pair, and makes a nested request
to a back-end key-value store, B . The purpose of these experiments is to
understand the potential benefit of using deterministic pipelining and spec-
ulation instead of sequential execution. Hence, our focus is mostly on the
amount of computation required by each requests, rather than the nature of
computation—which could be anything from performing queries in a database
to accessing files on a file server.
We run our experiments on a testbed with 12x 4-core Intel Xeon @2.4
GHz and 3x 16-core AMD Opteron @3.0 GHz, connected with a 1 Gb Ethernet.
We use the AMD machines as the execution nodes of the middle service and
use the Intel machines as clients, execution replicas for the back-end service,
and verification replicas for the middle and back-end service. Both services
are configured with u = r = 1, and have therefore three execution and four


























Figure 4.6: The throughput of Adam using deterministic pipelining.
one verification replica of each service on the same machine. This does not
affect our results, however, since verification is very lightweight compared to
execution and does not introduce a performance bottleneck.
4.5.1 Deterministic pipelining
Despite its simplicity, deterministic pipelining can be significantly faster than
sequential execution. Figure 4.6 shows the throughput of Adam using deter-
ministic pipelining and for requests that require execution times of 0.1 ms,
1 ms, and 10 ms. The performance of sequential execution is equal to the
performance of deterministic pipelining when only one thread is used. As
expected, in all three cases Adam’s throughput increases as more execution

























Figure 4.7: The throughput of Adam using deterministic pipelining when the
back-end service is optimized to use a small time interval for batching. The
execution time of each request is 0.1ms.
remains idle for smaller intervals, masking the delay of previously sent nested
requests. When requests are lightweight (e.g., 0.1 ms of execution time), the
importance of deterministic pipelining becomes more pronounced: a system
bound by sequential execution ends up spending most of its time—about
95%—idling, waiting for responses to its nested requests.
To understand why the middle service may have to wait that long, we
must take a closer look at the way requests are processed by the back-end
service. To mitigate the costs of performing agreement, replicated services
perform batching of requests: the primary waits until it has received a certain
amount of client requests or a predefined time interval has elapsed, before

























Figure 4.8: The throughput of Adam using deterministic pipelining when the
back-end service is optimized to use a small time interval for batching. The
execution time of each request is 1ms.
on the architecture. If the middle service is the only client to the back-end
service, then the back-end service will end up waiting for that time interval
to elapse, causing significant delays in the processing of nested requests. In
the experiments of Figure 4.6 that interval is set to 20 ms, which is the default
value used in UpRight [18] and Eve.
When the middle service is the only client to the back-end service, one
can tune this time interval, to reduce idle time at the middle service. Fig-
ures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 show the throughput of deterministic pipelining when
that time interval is reduced to 1 ms, for execution times of 0.1 ms, 1 ms, and
10 ms, accordingly. As expected, the speedup of deterministic pipelining is sig-
























Figure 4.9: The throughput of Adam using deterministic pipelining when the
back-end service is optimized to use a small time interval for batching. The
execution time of each request is 10ms.
execution—since, even when using sequential execution, the middle service
does not have to remain idle for quite as long. Once again, the benefit of
pipelining is more pronounced for lightweight requests, ranging from a 1.8x
speedup over sequential execution when the request execution time is 10 ms,
to a 2.2x speedup when the request execution time is 0.1 ms.
Note, however, that there are many cases where tuning the parameters
of the back-end service is impossible or undesirable. For example, the back-end
service might belong to a different administrative domain, or it could be that
our middle service is not its only client. Especially when the back-end service
is operating close to saturation, reducing the amount of batching performed in
























Figure 4.10: The throughput of Adam using parallel execution. The execution
time of each request is 1ms.
would drive that service past its saturation point, greatly increasing the latency
of requests and in turn hurting the throughput of our middle service as well.
4.5.2 Speculative execution
Our final experiment demonstrates the throughput of Adam when employing
parallel execution. In this setting Adam uses approach A1, where speculation
is resolved—by calculating the application token and performing verification—
before sending a nested request. Figure 4.10 shows the results of this experi-
ment. Notice that as more threads become available, the performance of Adam
increases, since more requests can be executed in parallel. The performance
increase compared to single-threaded execution is about 3.7x. We believe that
there are some steps one can take to reach even higher performance. For ex-
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ample, while parallel execution is important to increase system throughput,
pipelining of requests is still crucial, even though sequential execution is not
used. When the execution threads hit the wall, they currently remain idle
while waiting for the response to their nested requests. We believe that a
combination of the two techniques we propose in this chapter—deterministic
pipelining and the wall—should achieve even higher performance than any of
those two techniques in isolation.
4.6 Conclusion
Adam is a new replication library that allows replicated services to be de-
ployed in environments where they have to interact with other services. Pre-
vious replication protocols based on the Replicated State Machine abstraction
assume a client-server model, which, as we showed, can have significant perfor-
mance limitations and consistency problems in interactive settings. In Adam,
we trace the cause of these issues to the use of sequential and speculative ex-
ecution, and propose new techniques that address these issues, allowing fast




5.1 Replicating multithreaded services
The end goal of Eve is to allow a replicated service to maintain correctness
while executing requests in parallel. While we believe that an execute-verify
replication architecture is the most fitting way to achieve this goal, it is cer-
tainly not the only way. In this section we discuss other alternatives to achiev-
ing multithreaded replication and review other work that is related to Eve.
5.1.1 Deterministic Multithreading
Deterministic execution of multithreaded programs [6, 7, 9, 51] guarantees that,
given the same input, all correct replicas of a multithreaded application will
produce identical internal application states and outputs. Although at first
glance this approach appears a perfect match for the challenge of multithreaded
SMR on multi-core servers, there are two issues that lead us to look beyond
it. The first issue [8] is straightforward: current techniques for deterministic
multithreading either require hardware support [26, 27, 37] or are too slow
(1.2x-10x overhead) [6, 7, 9] for production environments. The second issue
originates from the semantic gap that exists between modern SMR protocols
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Figure 5.1: An example where ordering read-only requests (depicted as shaded
rectangles) differently at different replicas can lead to state divergence. The
replicas are using the DMP-O algorithm. The initial ownership status of vari-
able x is “shared” and the quantum size is 6.
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Seeking opportunities for higher throughput, SMR protocols have in
recent years looked for ways to exploit the semantics of the requests processed
by the replicas to achieve replica coordination without forcing all replicas to
process identical sequences of inputs. For example, many modern SMR sys-
tems no longer insist that read requests be performed in the same order at all
replicas, since read requests do not modify the state of the replicated applica-
tion. This read-only optimization [14, 18, 42] is often combined with a second
optimization that allows read requests to be executed only at a preferred quo-
rum of replicas, rather than at all replicas [38]. Several SMR systems [21, 74]
use the preferred quorum optimization during failure-free executions also for
requests that change the application’s state, asking other replicas to execute
these requests only if a preferred replica fails.
Unfortunately, deterministic multithreading techniques know nothing
of the semantics of the operations they perform. Their ability to guaran-
tee replica coordination of multithreaded servers is based purely on syntactic
mechanisms that critically rely on the assumption that all replicas receive iden-
tical sequences of inputs: only then can deterministic multithreading ensure
that the replicas’ states and outputs will be the same. Read-only optimiza-
tions and preferred quorum operations violate that assumption, leading cor-
rect replicas to diverge. For instance, read-only requests advance a replica’s
instruction counter and may cause the replica to acquire additional read locks.
Figure 5.1 illustrates an example where executing a set of read-only
instructions in a different order at different replicas can cause their state to
diverge. In this example, replicas use the DMP-O deterministic multithreading
algorithm [7], with a quantum size of 6. The shaded instructions represent
the instructions of a read-only request. DMP-O uses instruction counting to
guarantee that each thread eventually leaves the sequential mode, even if it
does not need to synchronize with other threads. In this example, the read-
only requests are executed after the request [x = 1] at Replica 1, but before
that request at Replica 2. The presence of the read-only requests before [x = 1]
at Replica 2 ends the quantum and “pushes” the request [x = 1] to the next
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quantum. This leads to different replicas serializing the [x = 1] and [x = 2]
requests in different ways, which causes the final value of x to diverge.
Paradoxically, the troubles of deterministic replication stem from stick-
ing to the letter of the state machine approach [45, 66], at the same time that
modern SMR protocols have relaxed its requirements while staying true to its
spirit.
5.1.2 Transactional processing systems
Vandiver et al. [71] describe a Byzantine-tolerant semi-active replication scheme
for transaction processing systems. Their system supports concurrent execu-
tion of queries but its scope is limited: it applies to the subset of transaction
processing systems that use strict two-phase locking (2PL). A recent paper
suggests that it may be viable to enforce deterministic concurrency control in
transactional systems [68], but the general case remains hard. Kim et al. [41]
recently proposed applying this idea to a transactional operating system. This
approach assumes that all application state is manageable by the kernel and
does not handle in-memory application state.
5.1.3 Semi-active replication and record-replay
One alternative is to use a replication technique other than state machine
replication. Semi-active replication [60] weakens state machine replication with
respect to both determinism and execution independence: one replica, the pri-
mary, executes nondeterministically and logs all the nondeterministic actions
it performs. All other replicas then execute by deterministically reproducing
the primary’s choices. In this context, one may hope to be able to leverage
the large body of work on deterministic multiprocessor replay [3, 22, 28, 49,
58, 59, 63, 72, 75, 76]. Unfortunately, relaxing the requirement of independent
execution makes these systems vulnerable to commission failures. Also, sim-
ilar to deterministic multithreaded execution approaches, record and replay
approaches assume that the same input is given to all replicas. As discussed
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in Section 5.1.1 this assumption is violated in modern replication systems.
Rex [32] recently proposed an alternative architecture for replicating
multithreaded services, based on the notion of deterministic replay. Instead
of the traditional agree-execute architecture, or Eve’s execute-verify, Rex pro-
poses a new execute-agree-follow architecture, which has a primary replica exe-
cuting requests, recording the nondeterministic events during that execution—
called a trace—including dependencies among synchronization events. After
the execution has finished, replicas run a consensus protocol to agree on the
trace that was executed by the primary. Finally, non-primary replicas execute
those requests, reproducing the nondeterministic decisions of the primary, to
guarantee convergence.
Rex represents a different point in the design space than Eve. Since
replicas no longer execute independently, Rex cannot tolerate commission fail-
ures. Also, Rex makes different assumptions than Eve when it comes to
guaranteeing correctness. In the execute-verify architecture, correctness de-
pends on being able to identify the relevant application state. In the execute-
agree-follow architecture, instead, correctness hinges on accurately capturing
all sources of nondeterminism, like data races and synchronization events.
5.1.4 Passive primary-backup
Remus [23] is a typical example of a passive primary-backup system. Remus
takes a different approach to replicating multithreaded services: the backup
does not execute requests, but instead passively absorbs state updates from the
primary: since execution occurs only at the primary, the costs and difficulty
of coordinating parallel execution are sidestepped. These advantages however
come at a significant price in terms of fault coverage: Remus can only tolerate
omission failures—all commission failures, including common failures such as
concurrency bugs, are beyond its reach. Like Remus, Eve neither tracks nor
eliminates nondeterminism, but it manages to do so without forsaking fault
coverage; further, despite its stronger guarantees, Eve outperforms Remus by
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a factor of 4.7x and uses two orders of magnitude less network bandwidth
(see Section 3.5.5) because it can ensure that the states of replicas converge
without requiring the transfer of all modified state.
5.1.5 Speculative systems
One of the keys to Eve’s ability to combine independent execution with nonde-
terministic interleaving of requests is the use of the mixer, which allows repli-
cas to execute requests concurrently with low chance of interference. Kotla
et al. [44] use a similar mechanism to improve the throughput of BFT repli-
cation systems. However, since they still assume a traditional agree-execute
architecture, the safety of their system depends on the assumption that the
criteria used by the mixer never mistakenly parallelize conflicting requests: a
single unanticipated conflict can lead to a safety violation.
Both Eve and Zyzzyva [42] allow speculative execution that precedes
completion of agreement, but the assumptions on which Eve and Zyzzyva
rest are fundamentally different. Zyzzyva depends on correct nodes being
deterministic, so that agreement on inputs is enough to guarantee agreement
on outputs: hence, a replica need only send (a hash of) the sequence of requests
it has executed to convey its state to a client. In contrast, in Eve there is no
guarantee that correct replicas, even if they have executed the same batch of
requests, will be in the same state, as the mixer may have incorrectly placed
conflicting requests in the same parallelBatch.
We did contemplate an Eve implementation in which verification is not
performed within the logical boundaries of the replicated service but, as in
Zyzzyva, it is moved to the clients to reduce overhead. For example, a server’s
reply to a client’s request could contain not just the response, but also the root
of the Merkle tree that encodes the server’s state. However, since agreement is
not a bottleneck for the applications we consider, we ultimately chose to heed
the lessons of Aardvark [16] and steer away from the corner cases that such
an implementation would have introduced.
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5.1.6 Finding concurrency bugs
Concurrency bugs are notoriously hard to find. Several tools exist that try
to identify as many concurrency bugs as possible, without introducing a large
number of false positives. Many of these tools focus on identifying concurrency
bugs that cause some immediate or severe system failure (e.g. a crash) [13, 57,
79]. These tools, however, are rather limited in scope, as concurrency bugs
frequently do not have any such immediate side-effects [31].
Pike [30] is a tool for finding such elusive concurrency bugs. Specifically,
it tries to identify two classes of bugs: semantic bugs, which manifest as any
violation of the application semantics, such as returning an incorrect result to
the user; and latent bugs, which silently corrupt internal data structures and
can potentially manifest much later, when they are triggered by a subsequent
input. To identify these bugs, Pike tests whether the parallel execution of a
set of requests matches—in terms of both outputs and application state—some
sequential execution of those requests.
Pike resembles Eve in that they are both concerned with preventing
silent corruption of the application state. Hence, both systems require some
programming effort in identifying the relevant application state and abstract-
ing away the irrelevant parts.
Other than that, though, Pike’s goal is fundamentally different from
Eve’s: to identify the source of concurrency bugs, rather than to mask them,
as Eve does. Additionally, Pike’s approach is based on the assumption that
even complex executions provide semantics that are reasonably close to lin-
earizability [36], which introduces false positives. Eve, instead, does not make
any such assumptions, since it does not need to detect the source of the bug—
or even to reason about what the applications semantics are. Eve simply uses
the redundancy that is inherent in replicated systems to mask concurrency
bugs, as long as they do not manifest in the same way across all replicas.
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5.1.7 Scaling State Machine Replication
There is a lot of work on improving various aspects of the performance of
State Machine Replication. Eve focuses on achieving high performance by
executing requests in parallel; as such, it focuses on environments where re-
quest execution is the performance bottleneck. Eyrie [10] has a similar goal:
to achieve scalability of the execution of requests by partitioning the appli-
cation state. Despite this partitioning, Eyrie guarantees linearizability, while
allowing commands to access any combination of partitions.
Other works have tried to scale the performance of State Machine Repli-
cation when the bottleneck lies in the agreement (or ordering) phase [39, 53–
56]. These works typically split the client requests into a number of sub-
streams of request, which are then ordered separately and then joined as re-
quired, before being executed.
5.2 Interacting Replicating State Machines
Service interaction is an integral part of building large distributed systems.
When faced with such interactions, previous works have proposed various so-
lutions; some to particular instances, others more general. In this section we
review previous work on service interaction and comment on the relation to
Adam.
Replicated Remote Procedure Call A number of early works provide
the functionality of a replicated—or fault tolerant—Remote Procedure Call
(RPC) [19, 20, 77]. These approaches typically provide mechanisms to ensure
that the receiving service will perform the requested procedure exactly once,
and that each replica of the sending service will receive the results of the
RPC, while providing transparency to the programmer, making Replicated
RPCs look like normal procedure calls. These approaches, however, predate
modern replication protocols and therefore do not consider the consequences of
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those protocols’ design choices. In particular, they do not address the perfor-
mance limitations of sequential execution, and, since they predate speculative
protocols, such as Zyzzyva and Eve, do not consider the possibility that the
RPC of one service might be based on speculative state that can not be naively
exposed to other services.
Optimizing procedure calls among services More recently, Song et
al. proposed RPC Chains, a technique that allows a number of interacting
services to optimize complex patterns of RPCs, by composing multiple such
remote calls into a single path that weaves its way through all the required
services. This technique aims to reduce latency by eliminating the require-
ment that an RPC always returns to the caller before the next RPC is called.
Although operating in a similar setting, where multiple services interact to
provide some high-level functionality, Adam and RPC Chains have very dif-
ferent goals. Adam’s main goal is to allow such interactions for replicated
services, while RPC Chains only targets singleton services.
5.2.1 Interaction among Replicated Services
Replication has been used in many previous works to enhance the dependabil-
ity of a certain service. When that service needs to interact with other services
or components, typically a custom protocol is used to regulate this interaction.
For example, in Salus [73] a replicated region server needs to issue requests to
a replicated storage layer. The resulting protocol is quite complicated, despite
the fact that the region server does not employ speculative execution. Simi-
larly in Farsite [2], groups of replicated nodes can issue requests to other such
groups. To simplify the protocol for those interactions, Farsite groups com-
municate through message passing and avoid using nested calls altogether. As
such, it does not address the complications most services would face in such
settings. Adam, instead, tries to provide a general solution that transparently
allows each layer to provide the abstraction of a single correct server, thereby




This dissertation rethinks the design of replicated services in the era of multi-
core computers and large cloud infrastructures. In particular, it presents the
design and implementation of Eve, a replication system that is based on a
new execute-verify architecture; and Adam, a replication library that allows
replicated services to be fast and correct, even in environments where they
must interact with other services. In this dissertation we make the following
contributions.
In Chapter 3, we take a closer look at the Replicated State Machine
abstraction and refine its specification, removing the unnecessary strength-
ening that had seeped into it: the assumption of sequential execution. We
believe that this refined specification expresses the essence of State Machine
Replication, free from implementation details.
We rethink the architecture of active replication protocols, taking into
account the need for multithreaded execution. Our insight is that it does not
make sense to agree on the order of requests before they are executed, since
multithreaded execution will undo that order, anyway. We therefore submit
that the traditional agree-execute architecture is not well-suited to supporting
multithreaded execution of requests. Instead, we propose a new execute-verify
architecture, which has replicas first executing requests in parallel, and then
trying to reach agreement; not on the order of requests, but on the outcome
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of the execution, namely the states and responses produced by the replicas.
We describe the design and implementation of Eve, a replication library
designed for the execute-verify architecture. To allow this architecture to be
efficient in practice, Eve takes the following steps. To make divergence un-
common, it introduces the mixer, an application-specific heuristic that tries
to identify commutative requests. The mixer is not assumed to be perfect; it
may occasionally allow non-commutative requests to execute in parallel, caus-
ing replicas to diverge. To check for such divergence efficiently, Eve organizes
the application state in a Merkle tree, which allows for rapid and incremental
computation of a hash of the entire state. Finally, to efficiently recover from
divergence, Eve uses a versioned copy-on-write mechanism, allowing for rapid
rollback and incremental state transfer.
In Chapter 4, we rethink our replication mechanisms in environments
where services communicate with other services. We show that two popular
execution modes, sequential and speculative execution, raise performance and
consistency concerns, respectively, when we move away from the traditional
client-server model.
To address the performance limitations of sequential execution in this
setting, we apply the end-to-end argument to replication, no longer insisting
that the replication library provide linearizability of requests. Instead, we
propose deterministic pipelining, a simple alternative to sequential execution
that guarantees replica convergence while not being subject to the performance
limitations of sequential execution.
To allow the use of speculative execution without creating inconsis-
tencies among services, we propose two techniques that allow speculation to
be used within a service, albeit in a controlled manner. The first technique
is transparent, resolving speculation before it is exposed to another service,
while the second trades transparency for lower latency, ensuring that nested
requests explicitly denote the speculation they depend on.
Through a combination of a novel architecture, protocols and mech-
anisms, Adam and Eve offer replicated services the necessary tools to meet
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the increasing demands of today’s computing world, in terms of both perfor-
mance and complexity. Just like their biblical namesakes, Adam and Eve are
expected to have descendants: there is still a long way to go and several prob-
lems to be addressed; chief among them is the challenge of providing efficient
replication solutions that handle all types of failures, without requiring manual
modification of the application code. This challenge is hard as it requires a
combination of independent execution and the ability to compare application
states in an automated fashion.
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